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J.F.C. Fuller's Assessment of Winston 
Churchill as Grand Strategist, 1939-45
ALARIC SEARLE
ABSTRACT
It  is  well  known that  Major General  J.F.C.  Fuller  was a  strong critic  of
British  Prime  Minister  Winston  Churchill's  grand  strategy  and  strategic
decision-making during the Second World War. Historians of Fuller's life,
military theories, and historical writing have offered, however, few expla-
nations as to the nature of this critique, when it first emerged, and what the
motivations  were  which  underpinned  it.  There  has  been  little  attempt  to
investigate  just  how well  Fuller  knew Churchill,  either,  or  the  extent  to
which this knowledge informed his historical writing. This article seeks to
correct  one  or  two  of  the  general  explanations  which  have  been  given,
arguing that Fuller's questioning of Churchill's wartime leadership was based
on a number of interlocking points of criticism, his personal knowledge of
the Prime Minister, and that it represented the first sustained literary attack
on his performance as a strategist during six years of total war.
KEYWORDS
Churchill,  Winston; Fuller,  J.F.C.;  grand strategy; historiography; Second




Writing to his American publisher in February 1961, Major General J.F.C.
Fuller  remarked that  while  he  had  not seen Winston  Churchill  for  many
years, he had seen a great deal of him during his time at the War Office from
1918-22, and had "met him frequently" throughout the rest of the interwar
period. He continued: "[t]he first occasion I saw him will amuse you; it was
away back in the late '90s; he was creating a pandemonium in a famous
London music  hall,  the Leicester  Square 'Empire'." Fuller  recounted how
Churchill, together with some other young men, "was dodging about in the
foyer,"  slapping  women on their  behinds,  with a  bouncer in  hot  pursuit.
Reflecting on this incident, he added: "His life has been one series of larks,
which  unfortunately at  times  he  mistakes  for  expressions  of  outstanding
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genius. Frequently they are superficially brilliant and normally profoundly
disastrous."1
This critique was, in amusing shorthand, very much the line which Fuller
followed in his major post-1945 publications, most notably his book,  The
Second World War, 1939-1945 (1948). Here he was highly critical of many
aspects  of  Churchill's  wartime  leadership  but,  in  particular,  strategic
bombing.  He  wrote  that  "it  was  Mr.  Churchill  who  lit  the  fuse  which
detonated a war of devastation and terrorization unrivalled since the invasion
of the Seljuks." In the conclusion, he added that the real task of a Prime
Minister in wartime was "to subordinate fighting power to a sane political
end," something which "Mr. Churchill utterly failed to do."2 This critique of
Britain's wartime leader, and his alleged desire for destruction in place of
policy,  was  repeated  in  several  other  publications.3 What  makes  it
remarkable  is  that  it  occurred  at  a  time  when  a  large  cross-section  of
Britain's elites were engaged in eulogizing Churchill's performance as Prime
Minister, characterized by a volume published in 1953, entitled Churchill –
By His Contemporaries.  While this book did offer one or two discordant
voices,  these  were  confined  to  those  on  the  political  left,  with  criticism
restricted to prewar domestic politics.4
In  fact,  no  historian  to  date  has  made  a  detailed  attempt  to  consider
Fuller's critique of Winston Churchill as a grand strategist. While they have
noted the way in which Fuller was a supporter of Churchill before 1939,
Brian Holden Reid and A.J. Trythall have not systematically assessed the
attacks on Churchill's conduct of the war in Fuller's wartime articles and
postwar books.5 Holden Reid has written that it is difficult to explain the
ferocity of Fuller's later comments on Churchill, but suggests that the former
"had  a  temperamental  aversion  to  siding  with  the  popular  view  of  any
subject."6 Fuller's biographer offers a slightly different interpretation when
1. Special Collections and University Archives,  Rutgers University (hereinafter SCUA
Rutgers), Major General J.F.C. Fuller Papers, box 3, file 34, Fuller to William Sloane, 3
February 1961. The incident Fuller was most likely referring to was a protest against the
threatened closure of the theater in late 1894 at  which Churchill  was the ring-leader.
However, the protest was really about public morals due to the presence of ladies of ill-
repute who hung around in the foyer, attracting not only clients but also guardians of
decency. For further details, see Martin Gilbert, Churchill: A Life (London: Heinemann,
1991), pp. 46-47.
2. J.F.C. Fuller, The Second World War, 1939-1945: A Strategical and Tactical History
(London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), pp. 222, 402.
3. For  instance,  J.F.C.  Fuller,  "Unstrategic  Bombing  and  World  Ruin,"  Ordnance 34
(September/October 1949), pp. 93-96.
4. Emanuel Shinwell, "Churchill as a Political Opponent," and George Issacs, "Churchill
and  the  Trade  Unions,"  in  Charles  Eade,  ed.,  Churchill  ‒  By  His  Contemporaries
(London: Hutchinson, 1953), pp. 75-83, 249-75.
5. Anthony John Trythall, 'Boney' Fuller: The Intellectual General, 1878-1966 (London:
Cassell, 1977),  pp. 214,  223,  236-37,  240,  249,  252,  258; Brian Holden Reid,  J.F.C.
Fuller: Military Thinker (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 199-200.
6. Holden Reid, J.F.C. Fuller, p. 200.
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he writes, "Churchill… came to symbolize for Fuller all the mistakes which
Britain was making by his insistence on policies of unconditional surrender
and area bombing."7 A closer study of the available material does suggest
that Fuller knew Churchill fairly well, so this raises the question of how and
why his initially very positive view of Churchill underwent such a dramatic
transformation.
The intensity of Fuller's criticism of Winston Churchill's prosecution of
the Second World War, and at a time when the issue of strategic bombing
was studiously avoided in the first retrospective considerations of the Prime
Minister's performance as war leader,8 raises a number of other interesting
questions. Since Fuller was a contemporary of Churchill (he was only four
years younger than him), was his criticism of his approach to total war partly
informed by his close knowledge of the Prime Minister's personality? Where
and when did he articulate his views? Most importantly, what was the nature
of Fuller's criticism of Churchill's strategy and which areas did it encom-
pass?  Finally,  to  what  extent  was Fuller's critique  of  Churchill's  wartime
leadership out of step with the views prevalent at the time?
Given that few figures in modern British political history have attracted
such  uncritical  praise  as  Winston  Churchill,9 but  also  considering  the
extremely positive assessments of him as a wartime strategist and military
leader,10 an  examination  of  the  opinions  of  one  of  his  earliest  and  most
intelligent  critics  suggests  itself  as  an  interesting  and  profitable  line  of
enquiry. One reason is that Fuller's critique of Churchill's wartime strategy
provided for many years one of the principal, authoritative alternatives to the
sort  of  widespread,  uncritical  adulation  symbolized  by  books  such  as
Churchill ‒ By His Contemporaries, a work which, itself, provides evidence
of the interweaving of Churchill's reputation with the official celebrations of
Britain's  Pyrrhic  victory in  the  Second  World  War.  Moreover,  as  David
Reynolds has argued, Churchill's  own history of  the war was considered
almost as a substitute official history in Whitehall.11 This can only heighten
7. Trythall, 'Boney' Fuller, p. 214.
8. Symbolic of the avoidance of the issue in the immediate postwar period is the con-
cluding chapter, A.L. Rowse, "The Summing-Up – Churchill's Place in History," in Eade,
ed., Churchill ‒ By His Contemporaries, pp. 336-49.
9. Among the more uncritical works, the standard biography is Gilbert, Churchill: A Life.
There  have,  of  course,  been  revisionist  interpretations,  notably:  John  Charmley,
Churchill:  The End of  Glory.  A Political  Biography (London:  Hodder  & Stoughton,
1990); and, Clive Ponting, Churchill (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994).
10. For instance: David Jablonsky, Churchill, The Great Game and Total War (London:
Frank Cass, 1991); Tuvia Ben-Moshe, Churchill: Strategy and History (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner,  1992);  Ronald  Lewin,  Churchill  as Warlord (London:  Batsford,  1973);  and,
John Keegan,  "Churchill's  Strategy," in Robert  Blake and William Roger  Louis,  eds.,
Churchill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 327-52.
11. David  Reynolds,  In  Command  of  History:  Churchill  Fighting  and  Writing  the
Second World War (London: Penguin,  2005),  pp.  xxv-xxvi,  226-27,  339-40, 499-502,
510-14.
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historical interest in any challenge to a view of the Prime Minister's perfor-
mance  as  a  wartime  strategist,  which  had  been  partly  manufactured  by
Churchill himself in the early aftermath of the conflict.
In order to pursue this subject in more detail, this article will address the
following areas: first, the documented cases of contact between the two men
during the Great War and then between the wars; second, Fuller's attitude
towards  Churchill  during  the  Second  World  War  while  he  was  writing
primarily as a journalist; third, Fuller's post-1945 view of Churchill, writing
this time as an historian; and, finally, the general context in which Fuller's
views were expressed. A detailed examination of J.F.C. Fuller's assessment
of  Churchill  as  a  grand  strategist  is  worthwhile  because  it  promises  to
provide new insights into highly critical views which were presented at a
time when very few – apart from those with direct experience of Allied and
British decision-making12 – dared to utter negative comments about the track
record in strategic decision-making of Britain's Prime Minister and Minister
of Defence. As we shall see, it was the intimate knowledge of Churchill's
personality, based on personal observation, which lends Fuller's assessment
an incisiveness equalled by only a very few of Churchill's contemporaries.
Encounters with Churchill, 1917-38
The first reference to Winston Churchill in Fuller's correspondence from the
Great War is to be found in a letter to his mother of 18 July 1917: "I hear
that Winston Churchill has been made Minister of Munitions. I think this
will be a good thing as he is interested in us so I understand. Besides he has
brains  if  no  principles  & many in  the  Government  have  neither."13 This
comment  reflected  Fuller's  deep-seated  prejudice  towards  politicians,  but
indicates  a  clear  if  naive  admiration  of  Churchill.  Setting  aside  Fuller's
experience of young Churchill  creating havoc in the foyer of the Empire
music  hall  in  Leicester  Square,  the first  occasion on which the two men
seem to have met was later the same year at Tank Corps Headquarters at
Bermicourt  in  northern  France  from  18-20  September.14 Writing  to  his
mother shortly afterwards, he recounted:
A few days ago we had Winston  Churchill  out  here[;]  he stayed a
12. Some of the earliest criticisms were voiced, first by an aide of Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Harry Butcher, then by Alan Brooke,  via the device of edited versions of his diaries:
Harry Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1946);
Arthur Bryant,  The Turn of the Tide, 1939-1943 (London: Reprint Society, 1957), esp.
"The Prelude," pp. 11-38, which attempts to prepare the reader for the shock of reading
Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke's candid views of Churchill, which created a sensation
when  the  book first  appeared.  See also  the  comments  in  Reynolds,  In  Command  of
History, pp. 39-40, 405-06, 514-20.
13. Liddell  Hart  Centre  for  Military  Archives,  King's  College  London  (hereinafter
LHCMA), Major-General J.F.C. Fuller Papers, IV/3/215, Fuller to his mother, 18 July
1917.
14. J.F.C.  Fuller,  Memoirs  of  an  Unconventional  Soldier (London:  Ivor  Nicholson  &
Watson, 1936), p. 162.
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couple of nights & I found him quite pleasant & very easy to talk to.
He was quick & knew all about T's but was not the least affected. He
gave me the impression that as far as he was concerned, he considered
the war would go on for some time yet.15
A further  encounter  took  place  on  4 December  1917 at  British  Army
General Headquarters (GHQ) at a conference on the 1917 tank program,
over which Churchill  presided.  Fuller  attended, together with other  Tank
Corps officers and their commander Hugh Elles; Fuller noted that Churchill
appeared disappointed with the attitude of GHQ. Fuller then visited him at
the Ministry of Munitions on 10 December; he requested that Fuller provide
some notes on tanks, which were delivered two days later. This resulted in a
further  meeting between Elles,  Fuller,  and Churchill  on 20 December,  at
which, according to Fuller's notes, Churchill "expressed his disgust at the
little enthusiasm shown by GHQ for Tanks." On 12 February 1918, Fuller
traveled to London to attend the Allied Tank Committee. The following day
he  met  Churchill  for  lunch,  where  he  complained  to  him  about  GHQ's
behavior over tanks; there was another lunch appointment with him on 16
February before Fuller returned to France.16
A more personal meeting occurred on the same day, 16 February 1918,
after Fuller had returned to his headquarters. While driving along a main
road not far from Tank Corps HQ, the vehicle in which Fuller was traveling
lost  a  wheel.  It  proved  impossible  to  refit  it  and,  after  waiting  twenty
minutes, he hailed the next motor car which appeared. To his surprise, it
contained Winston Churchill and the Duke of Westminster, and they invited
Fuller to dinner at a château around five miles from his headquarters. The
following day, Churchill took the trouble to travel to Tank Corps HQ where
he had tea with Elles.17 On 25 February 1918, Churchill visited Tank Corps
HQ once more for lunch, together with the Duke of Westminster, and Fuller
was able to have a talk with him.18 These early contacts impressed Fuller
because he became convinced that Churchill was a supporter of the Tank
Corps.
Once Fuller was transferred to the War Office in London in August 1918,
he  is  likely  to  have  seen  more  of  Churchill.  Moreover,  considering
Churchill's  position,  first  in  Lloyd George's wartime government,  then as
Secretary of State for War and Air in the Coalition Government formed in
January  1919,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  he  was  well  aware  of  the
15. LHCMA, Fuller Papers, IV/3/219, Fuller to his mother, 26 September 1917.
16. Tank  Museum  Archive  and  Reference  Library,  Bovington,  Dorset  (hereinafter,
TMARL),  Major-General  J.F.C.  Fuller  Papers,  Private  Journal  of  Lt.  Colonel  J.F.C.
Fuller, December 1917 to July 26, 1918, entries for 4, 10, 12 and 20 December 1917, 13
and 16 February 1918.
17. LHCMA, Fuller Papers, IV/3/226,  Fuller to his mother, 18 February 1918; Fuller,
Memoirs,  pp.  239-40;  TMARL,  Fuller  Papers,  Private  Journal,  entries for  16 and  17
February 1918.
18. TMARL, Fuller Papers, Private Journal, entry for 25 February 1918.
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arguments for the tank being propounded by Fuller. Many of Fuller's most
important arguments for the "mechanicalisation" of the army could be found
in Weekly Tank Notes, the internal government journal produced by himself
and another staff officer, which was likely to have been read by Churchill
since he had recommended in early 1919 to the Deputy Chief of the Imperial
General  Staff  that  some of  Fuller's  papers  be  published  in  a  volume for
confidential use.19
Evidence  of  the  influence  of  Fuller's  thinking  on  mechanization  on
Churchill,  in  particular  the  economies  which  could  be  made,  is  circum-
stantial. Nonetheless, Churchill was not someone to attribute ideas to others.
And, when one looks at speeches and writings by him from the early 1920s,
it seems likely that some of his statements on mechanization owed at least
something to Fuller. If we look, for example, at a speech in the House of
Commons from 23 February 1920, speaking as Secretary of State for the
Army and Air Force, he talked of the need for a mechanical army, the future
possibilities  of  the  tank,  and  the  "substantial  saving  in  cost"  which
mechanical warfare could bring. He called for the Air Force to make better
use of air power as a means of reducing the garrison in Mesopotamia, and
argued for a gradual employment of schemes for introducing economies.20 In
fact,  the  Tank  Corps  publicly  acknowledged  Churchill  as  a  supporter,
making him the main guest of honor at the second Tank Corps Cambrai
dinner at the Hyde Park Hotel in London on 20 November 1921, a dinner
attended by leading figures of the Corps, including Fuller.21
When one takes Churchill's penchant for military talent-spotting, particu-
larly with a  view to developing his  own sources of  military intelligence,
these early contacts seem to be more than of just a minor nature. 22 As the
Chief Staff Officer of the Tank Corps, Fuller was an extremely interesting
personality from Churchill's point of view. In many ways, they had much in
common.  In terms of  their  military careers,  both  had  attended the Royal
Military College Sandhurst,  Churchill  four years  before Fuller.  They had
both experienced the Boer War. Fuller's unconventional approach to military
affairs must have appeared intriguing to Churchill's restless and impatient
mind.  Politically  speaking,  in  1919  they  were  both  ferociously  anti-
Bolshevik. Considering Churchill's desire to intervene in the Russian Civil
War, it is possible he was aware of Fuller's suggestions made to the War
Office  that  a  tank  force  should  be  employed  against  Bolshevik  units.23
19. Fuller, Memoirs, pp. 344-45; Trythall, 'Boney' Fuller, pp. 75-96.
20. Hansard, HC Debates, 23 February 1920, vol. 125, cc1339-1455; 'By a Student of
Politics,'  "Army  Policy:  'Normal'  Cost  below  Pre-War.  Battle  Mechanics.  The  New
Tanks," The Times, 24 February 1920, p. 17.
21. "Tank Corps Dinner," Daily Telegraph, 21 November 1921; Caird Library, National
Maritime Museum, Greenwich, Sir Eustace Tennyson D'Eyncourt Papers, DEY/60, Tank
Corps Dinner, pamphlet, 1 September 1920.
22. David Stafford,  Churchill and Secret Service (New York: Overlook, 1998), esp. pp.
3, 5-6, 145-57.
23. The  National  Archives  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Kew  (hereinafter  TNA),  WO
Global War Studies  12 (3)  2015  │  51
Delivered by Ingenta to: University of Salford IP: 146.87.1.158 on: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 14:31:05
Copyright (c) Global War Studies. All rights reserved.
Indeed, as Paul Addison has noted, anti-Bolshevism was the defining feature
of the second political life which marked the "three lives" of his career in
politics.24 So, in the immediate postwar period, from 1918-22, there was a
great deal of common ground which he will have found between himself and
Fuller. It is likely, too, that Fuller will have seen Churchill as a fellow anti-
Bolshevik.
That Fuller believed Churchill was a supporter of some of his theories of
mechanization can be seen in an approach he made to him to request that he
provide  a  foreword  to  his  1928  book,  On  Future  Warfare.  Writing  to
Churchill in March 1928, Fuller asked whether he would be so kind as to
write a "brief foreword to a book I am bringing out." Enclosing the preface
and contents pages of the galleys, he explained that "[i]t contains the bulk of
the military gospel I have been preaching since the war." Although he noted
that he knew how busy Churchill was, he thought that "a few words from
you who had so much to do with the initiation of tank warfare will help
things on."25 As his initial note to his secretary began with the comment, "I
presume this is Napoleon Fuller of the Tank Corps?"26 a reference to Fuller's
nickname of "Boney," it is clear Churchill was aware who the correspondent
was.  But  although  he  decided  that  the  four  hundred  words  Fuller  had
requested would be too much given his workload, this was not a straight
rebuff.27
A few months later, in June 1928, Fuller received a letter from Churchill's
secretary, writing from the "Treasury Chambers," which read: "Now that the
Chancellor  is  back  in  London,  he  hopes  to  be  able  to  arrange  for  the
Luncheon which was frustrated by his illness. Could you come to him at 11
Downing Street on Thursday, the 21st, at 1.30?"28 This invitation shows that,
even though he was certainly not an intimate, Fuller was not a mere passing
acquaintance  of  Churchill's.  It  can  be  ascertained  from the  latter's  corre-
spondence that around the same time he was invited by Churchill to "a men's
luncheon  party."29 One  of  the  results  of  these  lunches  may have  been  a
request  the  following month  that  Fuller  supply Lord Birkenhead,  one  of
Churchill's cronies, with "some authoritative information or opinion on the
32/5685,  Col  J.F.C.  Fuller,  Proposal  towards  the  formation  of  a  Tank Expeditionary
Force, S.D.7, 14 April 1919.
24. Paul Addison, "The Three Careers of Winston Churchill," Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society, Sixth Series XI (2001), pp. 183-99.
25. Churchill  College  Archives,  Cambridge  (hereinafter  CCA),  Churchill/Chartwell
Papers,  CHAR 2/157/86,  Fuller  to  Churchill,  18  March  1928,  and  CHAR 2/157/87,
seven galley proof pages of On Future Warfare.
26. CCA, Churchill/Chartwell Papers, CHAR 2/157/85, note to Marsh, 21 March 1928.
27. CCA, Churchill/Chartwell  Papers, CHAR 2/157/82-83, Fuller to Marsh, 22 March
1928; SCUA Rutgers, Fuller Papers, box 2, file 12, Churchill to Fuller, 27 March 1928.
28. SCUA Rutgers, Fuller Papers, box 2, file 12, Marsh to Fuller, 11 June 1928.
29. Churchill  to  Sir  Roger  Keyes,  19  June  1928,  reproduced  in  Martin  Gilbert,  ed.,
Winston  S.  Churchill,  Vol.  V,  Companion  Part  I,  Documents,  The Exchequer Years,
1922-1929 (London: Heinemann, 1979), p. 1303.
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question  of  warfare  in  the  future."  Although  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial
General  Staff  had  passed  on  his  name,  the  request  to  call  on  Lord
Birkenhead at the India Office seven days later suggests that the request may
have been the result of discussions at the lunch.30
There is little doubt that Fuller's view of Churchill was, by the beginning
of the 1930s, colored by the latter's strong support for tanks in the Great
War.31 This can be seen quite clearly in his Memoirs of an Unconventional
Soldier, published in 1936. But is there anything more to be taken from the
pages of Fuller's memoirs, given its flattering portrayal of Churchill?  The
positive  view  presented  in  this  work  certainly  went  down  well  with
Churchill himself. On receiving a copy of the book, he wrote to thank its
author, remarking:
I am very grateful to you for sending me a copy of your book. I have
not had time yet to read it as I look forward to doing, but I notice you
have said one or two unduly complimentary things about me and my
work in helping with the tanks. I hope to read the book thoroughly in
the near future.32
But was this simply a question of an acknowledgement of Churchill's role
in  the  development  of  the  tank  during  the  Great  War,  or  was  there  any
political approval of Churchill at this time on Fuller's part? At any rate, the
references to Churchill by Fuller in his memoirs show that in 1936 he still
admired him, not simply for the support he had offered the cause of the Tank
Corps as Minister of Munitions, but also as a man who had cut through the
red tape of the War Office while he was serving as Secretary of State for
War.33
Despite Fuller's decision to join the British Union of Fascists in 1934,34
Churchill had no qualms about meeting him at Buck's Club in London at a
dinner  held  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  Alfred  Duff  Cooper,  in
February 1936,  which was also attended by Basil  Liddell  Hart  and Lord
Trenchard.  Liddell  Hart's meticulous notes on  the  conversation show the
range of topics which the guests discussed: the coordination of defense, the
danger from Germany, the value of the French Army for European security,
mechanization, the Cardwell system, airpower, the High Command, army
organization, and the Abyssinian War. In their discussion of the system for
30. SCUA Rutgers,  Fuller Papers,  box 2,  file 12,  civil  servant  [name illegible]  (India
Office) to Fuller, 11 July 1928.
31. Churchill's interpretation of the significance of the Battle of Cambrai was in line with
Fuller's works, going perhaps even further. In his criticism of the offensives of 1917, he
answered his own rhetorical question of what else could have been done by pointing to
Cambrai, and exclaiming, "'This could have been done'." See Winston S. Churchill,  The
World Crisis, 1911-1918, abgd. and rev. ed. (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1931), pp.
718-21.
32. SCUA Rutgers, Fuller Papers, box 2, file 16, Churchill to Fuller, 7 April 1936.
33. Fuller, Memoirs, pp. 364, 367, 373.
34. Trythall, 'Boney' Fuller, pp. 180-84.
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the coordination of defense, Liddell Hart noted that Churchill had started to
hog the conversation: "Twice when Fuller tried to get an innings, Winston
shut him up quite snappily – 'Do let me finish what I'm saying.' Then when
Fuller got a turn Winston's come-back showed that he had missed the point –
as Duff Cooper pointed out."35 On the question of the Cardwell system,36
Fuller argued that it needed to be abandoned, whereas Churchill wanted to
keep it, although Liddell Hart observed: "Winston… did not realise how few
British troops there were on the North-West Frontier." Fuller was quizzed by
Churchill on the war in Abyssinia, from which he had just returned. While
Trenchard left at 11.00, the rest of the party carried on talking until 12.30.37
By  the  mid-1930s,  though,  Fuller's  view  of  Churchill  had  started  to
contain hints of ambivalence. On the one hand, his main enemy was what he
described as "Baldwinism." For him, Stanley Baldwin was responsible for
the disintegration of the Empire and the illusion of collective security.38 In
May 1936, Fuller attacked Baldwin for what he saw as his incompetence in
defense matters, writing:
when Mr. Baldwin is faced with a great military problem, such as the
co-ordination of our fighting forces, instead of asking Mr. Churchill or
somebody who knows something about it to take charge, he spends
several  weeks  looking  around  for  a  man  who  has  less  brains  than
himself.
The individual who Fuller had in mind here was Sir Thomas Inskip, who had
taken over as the Minister for the Coordination of Defence, although he also
expressed a negative view of the understanding of military affairs on the part
of Alfred Duff Cooper, the Secretary of State for War.39 Yet, the criticism of
Baldwin,  Inskip,  and  Duff  Cooper  should  not  be  taken  as  an  immediate
35. LHCMA, Sir Basil Liddell Hart Papers, LH 11/1936/40, Notes on discussion at Duff
Cooper's Dinner – Buck's Club, 14 February 1936.
36. Among many innovations, such as the introduction of the new branches of Military
Education and Military Intelligence, probably the key principle of the Cardwell reforms
was the "localization" of regular  regiments  (i.e.  the  establishment  of a home base to
which they would return from active service) and their fusion with the auxiliary forces.
Interwar  critics  of  the  Cardwell  System  argued  that  it  was  incompatible  with  the
mechanization  of  the  army.  For  a  contemporary  defense  of  Cardwell's  reforms,  see
Lieutenant General Sir E.A. Altham, "The Cardwell System," The Journal of the Royal
United Service Institution 73 (1928), pp. 108-14.
37. LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 11/1936/40, Notes on discussion at Duff Cooper's
Dinner, 14 February 1936. Fuller's questioning of the viability of the Cardwell System
clearly made an impression on Churchill, for he wrote to Liddell Hart asking for further
information. LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/171/22, Churchill to Liddell Hart, 16
February 1936, and LH 1/171/23, Liddell Hart to Churchill, 20 February 1936.
38. Major-General  J.F.C.  Fuller,  "On  What  Should  Our  Foreign  Policy  be  Based?"
Action, 29 January 1938, p. 7.
39. Anon. [J.F.C. Fuller],  "Lessons from Ethiopia: Collective Insanity,"  Action, 7 May
1936, p. 9. On Thomas Inskip, see Sean Greenwood, "'Caligula's Horse' Revisited: Sir
Thomas Inskip as Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, 1936-1939," The Journal of
Strategic Studies 17 (March 1994), pp. 17-38.
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endorsement  of  Churchill  as  the  perfect  candidate  for  Minister  for  the
Coordination of Defence.
In an article on rearmament in August 1936, Fuller returned to his criti-
cism of Inskip's policies, arguing that more money needed to be spent on
aircraft  rather  than  battleships  and  infantry.  In  order  to  cover  up  "this
futility" there was "a constant chatter of war."40 It was then that his first criti-
cism of Churchill appeared, even if the article was published anonymously:
On the one hand, Mr. Churchill thunders against Germany, as eighteen
years ago he was thundering against the U.S.S.R. As he then missed
his chance of leading an army to Moscow, to-day he has joined Lord
Davies'  "New  Commonwealth,"  no  doubt  in  order  to  lead  one  to
Berlin.  He  startles  us  by  proclaiming  that  Germany  is  spending
800,000,000 a year on armaments and is getting something for them.
But instead, should we not be startled by the contemplation that, since
1919, we have spent several  thousands of  millions on our Fighting
Forces,  which  to-day  are  so  deficient  that  we  have  got  Thomas
Inskip.41
While  this  statement  was  not  a  direct  attack  on  Churchill's  abilities  in
defense matters, Fuller does raise here – apparently for the first time – the
issue of his judgement and his desire for publicity. And, in a report prepared
for British intelligence after one of Fuller's three visits to Nationalist Spain
during the Civil War, he singled out Churchill for criticism again, referring
to him as "the supreme intervener in the civil war in Russia during 1919-
1921"; this was followed with an indication of his disapproval of Churchill's
alleged new-found belief in the need to prevent a triumph of either side in
Spain.42
In short, during the 1930s Fuller made only a few negative remarks about
Churchill; and, even these appeared in articles which were published anony-
mously. After the outbreak of war, there was however a final twist in the
relationship between the two men, one which needs to be borne in mind
when considering Fuller's subsequent critique of Churchill as Britain's "su-
preme commander" during the Second World War.
The Second World War, 1939-45: A Journalist's Critique
The relationship  between Fuller  and Churchill  took a  new turn  once the
Second World War had begun. As a leading member of the British Union of
Fascists, Fuller was one of the few prominent members of Mosley's party not
40. 'By Our Military Correspondent' [J.F.C. Fuller], "Our Rearmament Racket: Preparing
for the Last War Instead of the Next," Action, 13 August 1936, p. 9.
41. Ibid.
42. SCUA Rutgers, Fuller Papers, box 6, J.F.C. Fuller, The Spanish Civil War: Behind
Franco's Front, typescript, n.d. [1937/38],  p. 67. For Churchill's  views on the Spanish
Civil War, see, for example, "Spain's Road to Peace," (26 November 1937), reproduced
in Winston S. Churchill,  Step By Step 1936-1939 (London: MacMillan, 1943), pp. 180-
83.
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to be interned in 1940. Was it, as has long been suspected, Churchill's pro-
tecting hand which prevented Fuller's internment?43 A clear and unequivocal
archive source which would clear up this question is unfortunately missing.
But one intriguing angle is provided by a few documents which show that
Fuller was proposed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Edmund
Ironside, as his deputy, and the proposal was discussed at a Cabinet Meeting
on Thursday,  19 October 1939. The minutes of  the meeting suggest that
some members of the Cabinet spoke in favor of Fuller, but that the Secretary
of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha, postponed a decision, thus success-
fully sinking the proposal.44 Had Churchill spoken up for Fuller? Yet, more
importantly, did Fuller later blame Churchill for not allowing him to return
to military service?
With the last chance of a return to military duty gone, for the duration of
the war Fuller was largely left to his own devices. His main area of activity
was  in  journalism;  and  it  was  in  this  realm  that  he  became  critical  of
Churchill, even if it took until 1942 for this work to gather any momentum.
Much of his writing for newspapers, in particular the Evening Standard, was
based on historical material, tailored to specific ideas which related to recent
events in the war. Thus, one article of 20 November 1942, celebrating the
British victory at the Battle of El Alamein, got round his lack of access to
information, other than what he was able to read in the daily press, by using
his knowledge of the Battle of Cambrai. He concluded: "Cambrai sowed the
seeds of a tactical revolution. El Alamein gathered the harvest in."45 There
were many other articles, born out of wartime necessity, ingenious in them-
selves,  but  with no striking insights.46 It  was not  until  1943 that  Fuller's
articles started to pack more journalistic punch.
In early 1943, Fuller quoted a statement by Churchill  in the House of
Commons from 11 November 1942 on the Battle of El Alamein, which had
pointed to the need for infantry to clear a path through the enemy defenses
for the tanks, which concluded with the comment: "This battle is, in fact, a
very fine example of the military art as developed under modern conditions."
Fuller  added,  with  a  hint  of  sarcasm:  "With  all  deference  to  the  Prime
Minister's tactical opinions, I should have said 'antiquated conditions,' and
for the simple reason that, between 1919 and 1942, the problem of neutral-
ising the anti-tank mine was not considered."47 This was not the opening of
43. Trythall,  'Boney' Fuller, p. 217, giving Liddell Hart as the source for this point of
speculation.
44. SCUA Rutgers, Fuller Papers, box 2, file 19, War Office Temporary Pass, 27 Sep-
tember 1939, and Fuller to Ironside, 16 October 1939; TNA, CAB 65/1/52, War Cabinet
(52), Conclusions of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, 19 Octo-
ber 1939, pp. 431-32.
45. J.F.C. Fuller, "Cambrai to El Alamein" (20 November 1942), in idem,  Watchwords
(London: Skeffington, 1944), pp. 15-17.
46. For instance, J.F.C. Fuller, "Wanted – A Super-General Staff," Evening Standard, 8
January 1942, and idem, "Send an Army to Russia," Sunday Pictorial, 15 March 1942.
47. J.F.C.  Fuller,  "Why  Not  Dig  up  the  Mummies?"  (31  March  1943),  in  idem,
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an  assault  on  Churchill,  rather  Fuller  started  to  identify  aspects  of  the
conduct of the war with which he did not agree: the two central points which
emerged in 1943 were the policy of unconditional surrender and the strategic
bombing campaign.
In April 1943 he took a swipe at the policy of unconditional surrender in a
piece criticizing what he saw as a lack of sophistication in British propa-
ganda aimed at Germany. Singling out a statement by a government minister
that all Nazi leaders and perpetrators of crimes would be tried and punished
with  the  utmost  severity,  he  remarked:  "It  is  not  the  contents  of  such
utterances that I question, instead it is the wisdom of broadcasting them to
the enemy." And he added: "When are we going to be a little more scientific
in our propaganda by keeping our Unconditional  Surrenders well  up our
sleeves?" He argued that if  the war aim of Britain was not the complete
extermination of the enemy, then propaganda needed to be directed towards
establishing a stable peace.48 In mid-August he returned to the subject and
launched  another  attack  on  the  policy:  "By rigidly fixing  'Unconditional
Surrender'  as  the  sole  means  of  terminating  hostilities,"  Churchill  and
Franklin D. Roosevelt had "committed the greatest act of unwisdom as yet
recorded during the war."49
While he would return again to the issue of unconditional surrender, it
was to the strategic bombing campaign which the majority of his writing was
devoted in 1943. In June he compared the bombing by the Royal Air Force
of Italian cities – Naples, Turin, and Milan – to the destructive campaign of
Attila the Hun in Italy in 452. If the comparison seemed inappropriate, he
thought one could also be made with the Wars of Religion, 1562-1648. He
did not apportion blame to any one country, but thought that "the crucial
question is, not who first unleashed this hurricane of destruction, but that all
nations were ready to unleash it." He considered that the violence could not
be stopped, so the only thing to be done was to win the war as quickly as
possible because the longer it lasted the greater would be the devastation.50
In August, he pointed out that once Mussolini's regime had been removed
the bombing of Italy had in fact intensified rather than been reduced.51
Nonetheless, behind the drive to destroy as much as possible he saw a
specific military mentality which he had encountered during the First World
War:  generals obsessed by calculating ever greater numbers of shells be-
cause, for them, numbers of shells was the way to win wars. But, as had
been the case in the First World War, uncontrolled destruction violated the
Watchwords, pp. 43-45.
48. J.F.C. Fuller, "Improperganda" (30 April 1943), in idem, Watchwords, pp. 53-56.
49. J.F.C.  Fuller,  "A  Straight  Talk  to  the  Politicians"  (15  August  1943),  in  idem,
Watchwords, pp. 93-96.
50. J.F.C. Fuller, "Back to Attila" (11 June 1943), in idem, Watchwords, pp. 69-71.
51. J.F.C. Fuller, "The Attack by Terror" (20 August 1943), in idem,  Watchwords, pp.
99-101.
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important principle of economy of force.52 More importantly, Fuller began to
raise  the  issue  of  what  the  destruction  from the  air  would  mean for  the
postwar  world.  While  he  still  adhered  to  the  assumption  that  what  was
happening was probably inevitable, he pleaded, "do let us understand what
we  are  doing  and  observe  its  results."  He  warned  that  another  year  of
bombing  of  this  type  and  Germany would  collapse,  creating  a  complete
industrial vacuum in central Europe. There would be no possibility of trade
for years to come, with the effect that there would be "years of grinding
taxation, of toil,  of rationing, of low wages, of small profits – of general
discontent."53
In August 1943 his attacks on the strategic bombing campaign became
stronger. In an article of 20 August 1943 entitled "The Attack by Terror," he
quoted Churchill, who had stated in relation to the war in Italy, "We shall
not stain our name by inhuman acts." But this had been followed six days
later  by  a  statement  from  the  Under-Secretary  for  Air,  Captain  Harold
Balfour, who had proclaimed: "We are going right on to the end with our
bombing attacks, just as long as the peoples of Germany and Italy tolerate
Nazism and Fascism."  Fuller  then  made  the  moral  case  against  strategic
bombing, objecting – as a soldier – to his own life being insured "by the
slaughter of women and children, whether they are Germans or Italians or of
any other nation." While the criticism was still directed at Churchill's gov-
ernment at this stage, it could not have been more unmistakable: "Since the
Irish massacrings of Cromwell – the moral and political effects of which are
still with us – this policy of terror is something quite new in our history."54
But  the  following  month,  he  made  a  more  direct  attack  on  Churchill's
conduct of the war.
In  an  article  on  the  question  of  the  opening  of  the  second  front,  the
invasion of northwest Europe in other words, Fuller argued that penetrating
the  Atlantic  Wall  would  depend  upon  surprise  and  the  use  of  airborne
forces. The invasion was essentially an air problem because a landing would
only be possible if air supremacy had first been established and the German
defensive forces prevented from reinforcing the main defensive line.  The
reason why the attack had not taken place was that "we have put most of our
eggs into the big bomber basket."  He then noted that  Mr.  Churchill  had
talked of the policy of strategic bombing as "an experiment worth trying
out."  He  concluded:  "Seeing  as  he  is  no  novice  in  things  military,  it  is
strange that it has not occurred to him that strategy is not an experimental
science,  and  that  it  is  strategy  which  should  invariably  set  the  tactical
52. J.F.C. Fuller, "Victory by Slide-Rule" (26 June 1943), and "Waste Not Want Not"
(30 June 1943), in idem, Watchwords, pp. 74-77, 77-79.
53. J.F.C.  Fuller,  "The Economic  Consequences of the War" (1 July 1943),  in  idem,
Watchwords, pp. 80-82.
54. J.F.C. Fuller, "The Attack by Terror" (20 August 1943), in idem,  Watchwords, pp.
99-101.
58  │  Global War Studies  12 (3)  2015
Delivered by Ingenta to: University of Salford IP: 146.87.1.158 on: Thu, 14 Jul 2016 14:31:05
Copyright (c) Global War Studies. All rights reserved.
pace."55 In another article the following month on the Second Front, he made
the point that it had first emerged for the Allies in August 1941, "not as a
strategical conception but as a political slogan."56
But  the  strongest  criticism of  Churchill's  strategic  conduct  of  the  war
occurred towards the end of the year. In a piece entitled "Policy and War,"
Fuller  began  with  several  quotations  from Carl  von  Clausewitz's  famous
work,  On War,  in order to highlight the point that policy is the directing
factor in war and that the subordination of political considerations to military
ones would be contrary to common sense. He argued that policy during the
present  war  had  not  been  governed  by self-interest,  but  rather  "violence
flogged into frenzy by hate." He then made a direct attack on Churchill:
Thus far, Mr. Churchill, the leader of our 1935 pacifists, has shown
such an unqualified gusto for war that he would seem to have over-
looked the fact that in war the constant aim of the head of a State is the
establishment of  a  profitable  peace.  Should this  be so,  then he has
subordinated the political point of view to the military, and, in con-
sequence, if Clausewitz be right, has jettisoned common sense. "There
is no sacrifice we will not make, no length in violence to which we
will not go", though excellent militarily, what is its political end[?]
He concluded by observing that "those hard-headed Englishmen who built
our Empire" would have been astonished at the abandonment of politics,
since they recognized that "a military victory is not in itself equivalent to
success in war."57
A particularly interesting article appeared on 30 January 1944, interesting
because in it Fuller leveled criticism at Churchill between the lines. Writing
about  the  snail-like  development  of  a  battle-worthy  British  tank,  Fuller
recounted  the  very  slow  and  imperfect  evolution  of  British  tanks  since
Dunkirk, pointing the finger at officialdom and the members of the Tank
Board, who he thought "certainly had open minds, for all were unhampered
by any knowledge of tank design whatsoever!" He noted that in June 1940
Mr. Churchill  had ordered a  new tank,  the A22 or Churchill,  which had
made a brief appearance at El Alamein, armed with a two-pounder gun, and
in Tunisia a few had appeared with a six-pounder gun. Fuller was describing
what is now known as the "great tank scandal."58 In describing a  tale of
official incompetence and muddle, he concluded: "For while no doubt the
55. J.F.C. Fuller, "Stalin's Second Front" (7 September 1943), in idem, Watchwords, pp.
107-09.
56. J.F.C. Fuller, "Strategy of the Second Front," Evening Standard, 29 October 1943.
57. J.F.C. Fuller, "Policy and War," (7 December 1943), in idem, Watchwords, pp. 134-
36. In articles in early 1944, he attacked the apparent descent of warfare into barbarity
and  complained  that  "individual  liberty"  had  disappeared  in  Britain.  J.F.C.  Fuller,
"Barbarity  of  War  Without  Rules,"  Evening  Standard,  4  February  1944,  and  idem,
"Danger in a New Socialism," Evening Standard, 18 February 1944.
58. For more details, see David Fletcher, The Great Tank Scandal: British Armour in the
Second World War, Part 1 (London: HMSO, 1989).
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Churchill tank in its present form has its uses and, indeed, many supporters,
despite its lack of speed, the fact remains that after four years of war, Britain
is still without a tank as good as the American Sherman." This comment
does  sound  suspiciously  like  an  attempt  to  use  the  "Churchill  tank"  to
provide a form of covert criticism of "Churchill the war leader."59
In an article in the  Leader in April 1944, Fuller addressed the changes
which had been brought about by the war, in particular what he regarded as
a new form of wartime society, which he dubbed "the factory-barrack order."
From the point of view of popular psychology in the new society made up of
soldiers and factory workers, the war could be divided into two periods: "the
Churchillian and the Stalinian." Fuller was outraged that since Stalingrad it
was not permitted to utter any criticism of Russia in the press. In his charac-
terization of the first phase of the war, there was a certain hint of sarcasm,
when he wrote that "the people were united in an invincible solidarity under
Mr. Churchill – their hero; 'sweat, blood and tears' was their slogan." 60 There
was  more  sarcasm directed  at  the  Prime  Minister  in  August  1944 in  an
article  on  the  financial  dimensions  to  the  war.  Churchill  was  quoted  at
length, speaking shortly after the gold standard crashed in 1931, it  being
noted that Hitler had been thinking along "identical lines" at the time: "But
Hitler was a dictator, therefore, unlike Mr. Churchill, it was necessary for
him to search out new methods."61
At the end of 1944, he returned again to the question of unconditional
surrender in an article in the Sunday Pictorial. Here he made the argument
that, with the "slogan" of unconditional surrender, the Allies had bungled in
the political sphere because any form of peace appeared to be worse for
Germany than the war itself. He argued that the spreading of destruction by
the soldiers had not been accompanied by political measures. In Italy in July-
August 1943 the Allies should have welcomed the Italians' defection; the
bomb  plot  in  July  1944  could,  likewise,  have  been  better  exploited
politically.  The  breakthrough  achieved  by Patton  was  also,  according  to
Fuller,  not exploited because it  was accompanied by Bretton Woods and
Dumbarton Oaks, and talk of international control of the Ruhr. He attacked
Churchill for his statement in the House of Commons on 23 February 1944:
"There will be, for instance, no question of the Atlantic Charter applying to
Germany as a matter of right and barring territorial transference or adjust-
ments in enemy countries." As well as convincing Germany not to surrender,
this  development  had  led  to  "a  growing  sense  of  doubt  and  uncertainty
59. Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, "Where Are Our Tanks? A Grave Exposure of Official
Blunders,"  Sunday Pictorial, 30 January 1944, p. 4. Fuller had written articles on this
subject earlier in the war, such as: "The Weapons of Victory," Sunday Pictorial, 19 July
1942; and, "These Weapons Will Decide," Sunday Pictorial, 6 September 1942.
60. J.F.C. Fuller, "Bricks and Blood" (The Leader, 8 April 1944), in idem, Thunderbolts
(London: Skeffington, 1946), pp. 59-61.
61. J.F.C. Fuller, "The Babes in the Wood" (6 August 1944), in idem, Thunderbolts, pp.
97-99.
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throughout the world as to what the Allied Powers were fighting for." He
concluded by asking rhetorically whether the war would end in a reasonable
peace or world revolution.62 The "dawn of liberation" had not in any way
tempered Fuller's critique.
After the Battle, 1945-61: The Historian's Critique
By the close of the Second World War, the perceived errors in Churchill's
approach  to  grand  strategy  were  already becoming  cemented  in  Fuller's
historical  view of  the  war.  Writing  shortly after  the  end  of  hostilities  in
Armament  and History,  a work first  published the following year due to
paper shortages, in discussing atomic energy he pointed to statesmen's lack
of  awareness  of  Clausewitz.  Making  another  dig  at  Churchill,  he  wrote:
"Had statesmen only consulted Clausewitz, they could not have fallen into
what  I  will  call  the  Churchillian  error  of  mistaking  military  means  for
political ends."63 It was this critique of Churchill, which had emerged during
the  war,  which  was  gradually  to  become  "formalized"  in  three  major
histories, most prominently in his 1948 book, The Second World War, 1939-
1945.
In this work, Fuller begins with one or two barbs directed at Churchill and
his personality specifically. From the Allied perspective, the surprise occu-
pation of Norway on 9 April 1940 ought to have led to a rapid response.
But, according to Fuller, "and in spite of the pugnacious Mr. Churchill being
at  the  time  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  except  for  laying  mines  in  the
Skagerrak nothing was done until the 15th to impede the invaders."64 Fuller
introduces at this point two key elements in his critique: the first is a refer-
ence to Churchill's instinctive pugnacity, which Fuller equates with lack of
serious  strategic  thinking;  the  second  is  to  question  his  much  vaunted
military abilities by highlighting the First Lord of the Admiralty's uncertainty
as to how to carry his operation through to a successful conclusion.65
Beyond personal flaws, it was in the section on the strategic bombing of
Germany that Fuller turned his guns on Churchill as a strategist. At least
between the lines, he voiced his disapproval of the fact that the British War
Cabinet was the only link between the ministries of the army, navy, and air
force,  and  that  Churchill  himself  was  that  link  because  he  was  Prime
Minister and Minister of Defence. This had enabled him, upon taking office
as Prime Minister, to launch strategic bombing in full. Fuller continued that
62. J.F.C. Fuller, "The Foundations of Victory" (Sunday Pictorial, 31 December 1944),
in idem, Thunderbolts, pp. 126-30.
63. J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History: A Study of the Influence of Armament on His-
tory from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the Second World War  (London: Eyre &
Spottiswoode, 1946), p. 199.
64. Fuller, Second World War, pp. 60-61.
65. Churchill's bungling in the Norwegian Campaign was picked up much later by critical
historians, among them: Basil Liddell Hart, "The Military Strategist," in A.J.P. Taylor, et
al., Churchill: Four Faces and the Man (London: Allen Lane, 1969), pp. 153-202, here
184-87; and, Ponting, Churchill, pp. 417-31.
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the attacks of devastation were not strategically significant, adding sarcasti-
cally that "the entire strategic problem was misread by Mr. Churchill and his
advisers – if he had any." He argued that, in 1940, Germany's main problem
was to  cross the English Channel.  But Churchill  had succeeded, through
strategic  bombing, in  separating air  power from sea and land power.  He
noted  mischievously  that  Churchill  should  have  realised  that  Britain's
strategic problem was, initially, essentially naval, as his great ancestor the
first Duke of Marlborough had done in his day. Ultimately, up to the spring
of 1944, the strategic bombing of Germany was "an extravagant failure,"
which prolonged the war through its cost in raw materials and manpower.66
In his narrative of the strategic development of the war, once again the
policy of "unconditional surrender" came in for intense criticism. When the
strategic initiative passed to the Allies in mid-1943, Fuller argued that the
Western Allies had failed to exploit the situation. With Italy on the point of
collapse, and German morale crumbling, this was the psychological point at
which  peace  terms  could  have  energized  the  German  opposition  whose
revolt  would  have  occurred  a  year  earlier  and  been  successful.  But  the
Casablanca Conference of January 1943 had led to the declaration of uncon-
ditional surrender as a major war aim: "Henceforth these two words were to
hang like a putrifying albatross around the necks of America and Britain."
Fuller  laid  the  blame  at  the  door  of  President  Roosevelt  and  Winston
Churchill because they had not asked themselves the question: "What is the
object of war?" For Fuller, the correct answer was, "to change the enemy's
mind." The impact of this error, as he saw it, was that, by prolonging the
war, Russia was to emerge as dominant in Europe by the end of the war,
leading  to  "the  replacement  of  Nazi  tyranny  by  an  even  more  barbaric
despotism."67
Fuller also implied that, in 1943, Churchill was determined to attack the
"soft under-belly" of Europe, his Italian campaign, but as a means of vindi-
cating his strategy in 1915. According to Fuller, "his prestige as a strategist,
backed  by  his  forceful  personality,  carried  the  day."  Criticism was  also
leveled at the way in which the declared goals of the strategy – to regain
command of the Mediterranean, draw German strength away from Russia, to
tie down German forces which would otherwise have been transferred to
France,  to  assist  the  resistance  in  Yugoslavia,  and  to  secure  the  Foggia
airfields in Italy – did not actually require the conquest of the whole of Italy.
That this became the actual central aim of Allied strategy Fuller ascribed to
"Mr. Churchill's persistence that the conquest of Italy should be vigorously
66. Fuller,  Second  World  War,  pp.  220-31.  The  reference  to  Marlborough  was  mis-
chievous because Churchill had authored a four-volume biography of John Churchill, 1st
Duke  of  Marlborough,  which  was  published  as  Marlborough,  His  Life  and  Times
(London: George Harrap, 1933, 1934, 1936, 1938). The writing of this work has been
considered as having acted as a form of preparation for Churchill  in the problems of
coalition warfare.
67. Fuller, Second World War, pp. 257-59.
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prosecuted after Sicily had been occupied." His final verdict could not have
been more damning, namely, that "the Allies hard won initiative was in part
squandered on a  campaign which for  lack of  strategic  sense and tactical
imagination is unique in military history."68 To quote Fuller, with his striking
turn of phrase, "Unconditional surrender transformed the 'soft under-belly'
into a crocodile's back; prolonged the war; wrecked Italy; and wasted thou-
sands  of  American  and  British  lives."69 The  consequences  of  the  Italian
Campaign were clear to Fuller: by the end of 1943, there was a wholesale
surrender by the Western Allies to Russian designs on Europe. "The Atlantic
Charter was thrown overboard" and Stalin was in a position to direct his
forthcoming offensives towards Eastern Europe and the Balkans. For Fuller,
the  ultimate  humiliation  was  the  presentation  on  29  November  1943  at
Tehran of a Crusader's sword to Stalin by Churchill, "to the strains of the
Internationale."70
There was more criticism at the grand strategic level which was reserved
for Churchill and Roosevelt in relation to the dropping of the two atomic
bombs on Japan. If the demands of unconditional surrender on the country
had  been  abandoned,  and  the  Emperor's  position  had  been  preserved,
according to Fuller there might have been the opportunity to have avoided
the detonation of  the bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.71 In his  con-
cluding thoughts, Fuller laid further blame at Churchill's door, accusing him
of being "ever consistent in his inconsistency." While the Prime Minister
had "for years thundered against Stalinism," he opened the gates of Europe
to an invasion by the Russians. His hatred of Hitlerism blinded him politi-
cally and strategically to the need for a balance of power in Europe, so that
"he wrecked the foundations upon which the British Empire had been built."
Due to  Churchill's  pursuit  of  "unlimited  warfare  to  its  ultimate  end,"  by
annihilating Germany he demolished the basis for Britain's traditional strat-
egy and foreign policy. And, he had put Douhet's strategic bombing theory
into practice "because it fitted his policy of annihilation."72
Finally, Fuller sought to counter the objection that the war had been a life
and death struggle and, therefore, that Churchill had been right to apply all
means available to winning the war. He argued that the struggle was never
one between life and death, as long as Britain retained command of the seas:
in fact, after the Battle of Britain, the conflict settled into a stalemate. He
thought that the excuses which were offered in 1940 and 1941 to justify a
policy of  annihilation  were  clearly redundant  well  before May 1943.  He
accused Churchill of having failed to recognize that "the Russian way of life
was more antagonistic to the British than the German way of life." A "far-
sighted statesman" would have done everything to prevent the obliteration of
68. Ibid., pp. 260-61.
69. Ibid., p. 265.
70. Ibid., pp. 280-81.
71. Ibid., pp. 390-97.
72. Ibid., p. 400.
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Germany, but  unfortunately "far-sightedness was not  Mr.  Churchill's out-
standing quality." Fuller went even so far as to consider Churchill's motiva-
tion to be his own historical reputation as warlord and strategist. Churchill
had failed in his grand strategy because he subordinated political ends to
military means.73
After the publication of his history of the Second World War,74 Fuller
displayed  a  remarkable  bitterness  towards  Churchill  which  was  also  re-
flected in his private correspondence. In November 1948 he wrote to Liddell
Hart that Churchill had been "quite the worst S. of S. [Secretary of State] for
War we ever had." He argued that in 1920 Churchill had had "every oppor-
tunity to put the army on a reasonably modern footing." Yet this chance had
been squandered "in his private war with Lenin." For a quarter of the £100
million  which  he  wasted,  the  army could  have  had  everything  which  it
wanted.75 This  interpretation  demonstrates  that  Fuller  had  turned  against
Churchill's  historical  reputation  completely,  not  simply  his  reputation  as
Britain's wartime leader. He followed up this verdict the following year with
an even more caustic statement:
My opinion of Churchill is that he is the greatest mountebank since
Nero.... Like Nero he is an expert in turning sumersaults in the arena,
in short a highly popular clown, who in the Press has been transformed
into a supreme artist. Nero, however, had the better of him in that he
committed  suicide  when comparatively young:  that,  at  least,  was  a
decent act.76
Even more interesting are the remarks made about Churchill in 1956 in
the third volume of Fuller's  Decisive Battles of the Western World, as his
criticism is not restricted to the Second World War.  In discussing the ill-
fated Gallipoli operation, he referred to Churchill's obsession with the idea.
His judgement was scathing: "As a problem of pure strategy the idea was
brilliant. But without a powerful Greek army to back it, it was amateurish,
because England was not capable of fighting on two fronts, and the British
Army  was  neither  equipped  nor  trained  to  fight  in  a  theatre  such  as
Gallipoli."  He  accused  Churchill  of  having  become  "hypnotized"  by the
prize,  so  that  he  "forced  his  Dardanelles  card  on  the  Government,"  thus
pushing them into "a campaign which in the end proved as disastrous as that
of Saratoga."77 This portrayal of the then First Lord of the Admiralty as an
73. Ibid., pp. 400-02.
74. Although  the  book was  published  in  1948,  the  manuscript  appears  to  have  been
finished the previous year, as Fuller's preface is dated 1 September 1947. Fuller, Second
World War, p. viii.
75. LHCMA, Liddell  Hart Papers,  LH 1/302/362,  Fuller to Liddell  Hart,  5 November
1948.
76. LHCMA, Liddell  Hart Papers, LH 1/302/418,  Fuller to Liddell  Hart, 7 September
1949.
77. J.F.C. Fuller,  The Decisive Battles of the Western World and their Influence upon
History, Vol. III,  From the American Civil War to the End of the Second World War
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amateur strategist was important because it provided a basis for the main
attack on the reputation of Churchill as warlord in the Second World War.
In actual fact, in the chapter on "The Rise of the Third Reich" there is still
a clear hint of Fascism in what Fuller writes.78 This brief chapter is not only
interesting because it calls into question Churchill's version of events in the
1930s in volume one of his six-volume history of the war. It also shows why
Fuller's critique failed to attract the intellectual attention it probably merited:
his interpretation could be easily dismissed because of his, at times, apparent
sympathy for the fascist project. This can be explained in part by the way in
which the three-volume study of decisive battles had derived from an earlier
two-volume work, written in 1939 and 1940, which was heavily laced with
elements of Fuller's interwar fascist leanings.79 Moreover,  at a time when
Britain was still celebrating its "finest hour" against the Nazi war machine,
there were simply too many nuances in Fuller's version of events to make it
palatable to the general public.
The references to Churchill's performance in the Second World War are
interesting  because  Fuller  does  not  concentrate  on  the  strategic  bombing
campaign, rather on grand strategy on land and at sea. Beginning with the
Battle of France, he noted that towards the end of June 1940, there was "a
dreamland  of  political  fantasy"  which  mainly "emanated  from the  fertile
brain of Mr. Churchill," mocking at the same time the Prime Minister's dec-
laration of an "indissoluble union" of Britain and France.80 Predictably, he is
critical of the alliance with Russia, arguing that "Mr. Churchill should not
have impulsively thrown himself into the arms of the Soviets, but should
have paused until Stalin had sought his aid." At that moment there should
have been a demand that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 23 August 1939 be
annulled.81 Fuller  goes on to  repeat  his  criticism of the policy of  uncon-
ditional surrender, Churchill's muddle-headed approach to the selection of
objectives after the war in Africa had been won, the bombing of German
cities, coupled with a scathing attack on his "victory at all costs" approach,
which was the negation of policy, and his "blind trust in Russia's motives,"
which could only be explained by his,  and Roosevelt's,  ignorance of  the
country's history.82
Fuller's final historical verdict on Churchill was presented in 1961 in his
popular survey of warfare,  The Conduct of War, 1789-1961. Here many of
his  earlier  points  were repeated,  but  in  a  slightly milder  form.  Thus,  his
criticism of the Gallipoli operation did not contain the same level of bite as it
(London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1956), pp. 233-35.
78. Ibid., pp. 364-76.
79. J.F.C. Fuller,  Decisive Battles, Vol. I,  From Alexander the Great to Frederick the
Great (London:  Eyre and Spottiswoode,  1939); idem,  Decisive Battles,  Vol.  II,  From
Napoleon the First to General Franco (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1940).
80. Fuller, Decisive Battles of the Western World, Vol. III (1956), pp. 407-08.
81. Ibid., pp. 449-50, 479.
82. Ibid., pp. 507-09, 514-16, 544-52, 558-61, 630-32.
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had in 1956, since he noted that the "masterful spirit among these would-be
escapists was Mr. Churchill." He also mentioned "the forceful oratory of Mr.
Churchill" which "persuaded the War Council to accept the project in the
form of a naval bombardment." If the attacks on Churchill were less intense,
Fuller still considered Gallipoli to have been "escapist strategy," thus provid-
ing a platform from which to question Churchill's entire approach to grand
strategy during the Second World War.83
In considering the war, Fuller adopted a new line of attack, at the same
time defending Neville Chamberlain.  He argued that Baldwin had so ne-
glected defense that Chamberlain, when he became Prime Minister on 28
May 1937, "had no military backing to his diplomacy." As an alternative to
appeasement, Churchill had advocated an alliance with Russia, but this had
been "repugnant" to Chamberlain, a repugnance shared by Fuller. In fact, in
Fuller's view, Chamberlain had assessed Stalin's intentions more realistically
than Churchill. And, he quoted from a speech by Churchill in the House of
Commons on the outbreak of war to the effect that the war was neither for
Poland nor Danzig, but was a struggle against good and evil. For Fuller, this
"crusade of righteousness" set the tone for the rest of the war. Moreover, it
was at this point in his narrative that he made plain his scepticism of the
soundness of Churchill's strategic judgment. After he became First Lord of
the Admiralty on 3 September 1939, "he was soon engaged at his old game
of devising diversionary sideshows."84
Fuller pointed out that Churchill's "next diversionary side show" was the
Narvik expedition which caused the Chamberlain administration to collapse,
leaving  the  way open  for  "the  cause  of  the  collapse"  to  become  Prime
Minister and Minister of Defence on 10 May 1940.85 To be fair, a form of
balance was achieved in the statement that:
Churchill was a man cast in the heroic mould, a berserker ever ready to
lead a forlorn hope or storm a breach, and at his best when things were
at their worst. His glamorous rhetoric, his pugnacity, and his insistence
on annihilating the enemy appealed to human instincts, and made him
an outstanding war leader, which was the greatest of his contributions
to his country.86
Yet this positive summary was then tempered by quotations from several
British generals, who had pointed to Churchill's inability to see the whole
strategic picture and, to make matters worse, his obstinacy when faced with
facts which showed a scheme he had set his heart on to be ill-advised. And,
Fuller  rounded off  his  criticism with  his  central  point  that  for  Churchill
83. J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789-1961: A Study of the Impact of the French,
Industrial, and Russian Revolutions on War and its Conduct (London: Eyre & Spottis-
woode, 1961), pp. 161-65.
84. Ibid., pp. 249-52.
85. Ibid., p. 253.
86. Ibid.
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victory very quickly became an end in itself as opposed to a means to an
end.87
Subsequent references to Churchill in the book show him to have been:
amazed at the speed with which the Allied armies collapsed in France in
May 1940; unable to exploit the German invasion of Russia to prolong the
war to Britain's advantage; guilty of sacrificing Poland in the Anglo-Soviet
Treaty of 26 May 1942; unwilling to aid the German resistance to Hitler;
and, incapable of exploiting the opportunity of demanding the nullification
of the Soviet-German Pact of 1939 and the release of all Polish prisoners
and deported Poles from Soviet captivity.88 Beyond war aims and Churchill's
failure to recognize the threat of Communism after the conflict, Fuller also
passed judgement again on the strategic bombing of Germany. He argued
that, while in the First World War Churchill had understood the role of air-
craft  as  a  means  of  support  for  the  main  battle,  in  the  Second  Bomber
Command became the Prime Minister's "private army."89 To round off this
damning verdict, Fuller accused Churchill of having been partly responsible
for the Russian domination of Europe by the close of the war, but oblivious
as to his own part "in bringing this calamitous situation about."90
The final  salvo of  Fuller's critique  of  Churchill  and  Roosevelt  in  The
Conduct of War was, even in 1961, controversial – something of which he
was only too aware. Writing to his American editors at Rutgers University
Press,  he commented that his publishers in England had been alarmed at
some passages in the book and that he had undertaken to recast the section
on "President Roosevelt's pro-Soviet Policy, so as to avoid as far as I can
unnecessarily offending my American readers."91 In fact, while working on
the final amendments he noted: "I am well aware that my strictures on the
conduct  of  World  War  II  by  Roosevelt  and  Churchill  will  arouse  con-
siderable opposition on the part of not a few readers." But he added that,
while they "were no doubt honest and patriotic men… the present world
indigestion is to be attributed to their defective cookery."92 Fuller's views
were  not  simply  controversial  for  the  sake  of  creating  a  stir;  he  was
convinced that wartime policies had had a disastrous effect on the postwar
world order.
Fuller's Critique in Historical Context
An  interpretation  of  the  historical  significance  of  Fuller's  critique  of
Churchill depends, naturally, upon a consideration of the views which were
dominant during the war and in the decade and a half after its conclusion. At
87. Ibid., pp. 253-55.
88. Ibid., pp. 259-60, 265-66.
89. Ibid., pp. 279-87.
90. Ibid., pp. 303-04.
91. SCUA Rutgers, Fuller Papers, box 3, file 34, Fuller to Sloane, 3 February 1961.
92. SCUA Rutgers, Fuller Papers, box 3, file 34, Fuller to Helen Stewart, 31 January
1961.
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first  glance,  the  published  wartime  assessments  of  Churchill's  leadership
suggest that Fuller was one of only a small number of voices offering any
serious criticism. In one wartime biography, it was stated: "The vigilance
and judgment of Churchill were equal to all situations." And, in the final
paragraph, written needless to say under the pressures of  the situation in
1941, it was proclaimed that "Britain had at last found dauntless, incom-
parable leadership." Moreover: "The free discipline of the British responded
generously to a Churchill, for the people saw in him the embodiment of all
that was noble in their history and the finest qualities in their race."93
It is interesting that in the United States, too, wartime propaganda very
quickly worked its way into otherwise thoughtful  assessments.  In a book
published in 1941, H.A. de Weerd commented in a biographical sketch of
Churchill that he was to reach his lifelong goal of becoming Prime Minister
"only at a moment when the military fortunes of the British Empire were at
the  very bottom of  the  abyss."  But  there  was  no  mention  of  Churchill's
culpability in the fiasco of the Norwegian Campaign. Rightly referring to the
galvanizing effect of Churchill's personality in 1940 after the Fall of France,
de Weerd nonetheless credits Churchill's various strategic moves in 1941 as
having forced Hitler to engage in a two-front war by invading Russia. While
even suggesting that he might not remain Prime Minister until the end of the
war, he confirmed the view held by some in the United States, even in 1941,
that Churchill's talents were "military rather than political."94
One indication of the reticence to criticize Churchill in print during the
war is provided by Basil Liddell Hart, who, according to Brian Bond, was a
critic of strategic bombing and the policy of unconditional surrender, while
he is also claimed to have "maintained a consistently critical attitude towards
British  and  Allied  policy throughout  the  Second World  War."95 There  is
certainly no doubt that Liddell Hart was – in his private correspondence, that
is  –  a  critic  of  the initiation of  the bombing of  Germany by the British,
describing it as "the depth of stupidity," while he was clearly in sympathy
with those who were suspicious of Churchill as a war leader.96 Yet, in his
published articles  during the  war  there  is  no  criticism of  Britain's Prime
93. R.H. Kiernan, Churchill (London: George Harrap, 1942), pp. 209-10. A similar tone
can be found in Esmé Wingfield-Stratford,  Churchill: The Making of a Hero (London:
Victor Gollancz, 1942).
94. H.A. de Weerd,  Great Soldiers of the Two World Wars (New York: W.W. Norton,
1941), pp. 184-88.
95. Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought (London: Cassell, 1977),
pp. 119-63.
96. This comes across strongly in his correspondence with Bishop George Bell. See here
LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/58/7, Liddell Hart to Bell, 16 November 1940, LH
1/58/13, Bell to Liddell Hart, 3 December 1940, LH 1/58/20, Liddell Hart to Bell, 7 May
1941, LH 1/58/49, Bell to Liddell Hart, 4 January 1944, and LH 1/58/50, Liddell Hart to
Bell,  4  January  1944.  On  Bell,  see:  Ronald  C.D.  Jasper,  George  Bell,  Bishop  of
Chichester (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); and, Kenneth Slack,  George Bell
(London: SCM Press, 1971).
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Minister at all, while anything approaching criticism of strategic bombing
cannot be found either.97 The only genuinely critical wartime manuscript on
unconditional  surrender  in  his  papers  was  either  rejected  by  newspaper
editors, or not submitted.98
Naturally,  while  the  war  was  raging,  journalists  and  writers  could  be
forgiven for any unwillingness to question Churchill's military abilities. Yet,
works published shortly after the end of the war were, in many ways, even
less critical, as they tended to interpret the final outcome of events as having
vindicated all the Prime Minister's strategic decisions.99 The voices of criti-
cism remained largely restricted to those on the left,  such as the postwar
Labour MP, Emrys Hughes,100 whose 1950 book on Churchill highlighted
his volte face on Bolshevism, as well as taking up the idea that the policy of
unconditional surrender had prolonged the war.101 But there is no doubt that
one major factor in the positive views on Churchill was because he himself
did all he could to influence the writing of the history of his wartime perfor-
mance by building his own history of the war on privileged access to official
documents.102 And, what is particularly revealing is that of the thirty-nine
separate contributions to the commemorative work Churchill ‒ By His Con-
temporaries,  there  was  not  a  single  assessment  of  the  wartime  Prime
Minister  as  a  strategist,  despite  three  separate  chapters  covering  his
relationship with the army, navy, and air force.103
It  is  noteworthy,  however,  that  military  opinion  in  Britain  was  quite
tolerant  towards  Fuller's  interpretation  of  the  Second World  War,  as  the
reviews which appeared in The Journal of the Royal United Service Institu-
97. See, for instance, B.H. Liddell Hart, "This is Strategic Bombing," Daily Mail, 8 May
1944, which offers a purely descriptive account of bombing; and, also idem, "After the
Verdict," The Leader, 24 February 1945.
98. LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 10/1944/52, BHLH, The Price of "Unconditional
Surrender," 7 December 1944. See also earlier, more imprecise, thoughts, to be found in,
Bodleian  Library,  Oxford  (hereinafter BOL),  Gilbert  Murray Papers,  MS 150,  fol.48,
BHLH, The Background to "Unconditional Surrender," typescript, 31 July 1943.
99. A typical example is Malcolm Thomson,  The Life and Times of Winston Churchill
(London: Odhams, 1945), pp. 233-317.
100. Emrys Hughes (1894-1969), Member of Parliament for South Ayrshire, 1946-1969,
who authored a biography of Keir Hardie in 1956, whose daughter he had married in
1924. He had been a conscientious objector in the First World War. He also published a
biography of Harold Macmillan in 1962.
101. Emrys Hughes,  Winston Churchill in War and Peace (Glasgow: Unity Publishing,
1950), esp. chs. XXV and XXIX; it is interesting to note that on p. 204 he quotes from a
wartime  article  by  Fuller  from  the  Sunday  Pictorial which  attacked  the  policy  of
unconditional surrender in the strongest terms.
102. Reynolds, In Command of History, passim, but esp. pp. 23-35, 49-63.
103. Lieutenant General H.G. Martin, "Churchill and the Army," Admiral Sir William M.
James, "Churchill and the Navy," and Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferté,
"Churchill the Airman," in Eade, ed., Churchill ‒ By His Contemporaries, pp. 7-22, 88-
101, 102-13. All three chapters cover Churchill's involvement in the three services prior
to  September  1939  and  only  deal  with  the  Second  World  War  in  the  most  cursory
fashion.
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tion make clear. The review of The Second World War acknowledged that it
was "a lively and provocative book."  Even if  readers did not  agree with
Fuller, "they will be provoked to much useful thought and study to find the
answers  to  his  arguments."  Still,  the  review ended  with  the  observation:
"One would put this book down with a rather happier feeling if the criticism
of individuals had been less  caustic."  It was observed that Churchill  and
Roosevelt  had  been  "severely  handled,"  the  reviewer  admonishing  that
proper allowance needed to be made for  the decision-makers at  the time
since they lacked knowledge of the enemy's plans.104 Ironically,  the third
volume of The Decisive Battles of the Western World, the book which was
perhaps  most  objectionable  given  its  decidedly fascist  tone,  attracted  no
criticism at all in the review in the journal. The critique of Churchill is not
mentioned,  indeed  the  book  was  recommended  to  students  at  the  Staff
College, Camberley.105 In the review of The Conduct of War, there was no
disapproving tone towards his critique of Churchill and Roosevelt; in fact,
the chapters on the strategic bombing of Germany and unconditional sur-
render were considered to be particularly fascinating.106
It was not just military officers who found Fuller's analysis of the Second
World  War  appealing.  A  leading  critic  of  Churchill,  Francis  Neilson,107
identified Fuller's 1948 book on the history of the war as one of four works
which he thought were essential reading on the Fall of France, and which
provided  a  corrective to  the  second volume of  Churchill's  history of  the
war.108 In his reviews of each of Churchill's six volumes in  The American
Journal of Economics and Sociology, he had been determined to highlight
the  inaccuracies  in  his  portrayal  of  the  war.  In  his  review  of  the  third
volume,  The Grand Alliance, he commented that he always recommended
Fuller's history of the war as it could "be understood by an ordinary, intelli-
gent citizen." Echoing Fuller's criticism of the Prime Minister's alleged con-
fusion over war aims, he pointed out that in the eleventh chapter the author
had given "us a much-needed lesson on war and what its purpose should be."
This endorsement was rounded off by a remark on "the sanity of thought and
vision to be found in its pages."109
104. Anon.  review of  The Second World  War,  1939-1945,  The Journal  of  the Royal
United Service Institution 93 (August 1948), pp. 501-02.
105. Anon. review of The Decisive Battles of the Western World, Vol. III, The Journal of
the Royal United Service Institution 101 (November 1956), p. 620.
106. Anon. review of  The Conduct  of  War,  The Journal  of  the Royal United Service
Institution 106 (November 1961), pp. 602-03.
107. Francis Neilson (1867-1961) was the author of over sixty books; he was also an
actor, playwright, and stage director; he moved from Britain to the United States, aged
eighteen. He subsequently returned to Britain and served as a Member of Parliament,
1910-1916. He resigned from parliament due to his pacifist beliefs during the First World
War and returned to the United States.
108. Review of  Winston  Churchill,  Their  Finest  Hour (1949),  reproduced  in  Francis
Neilson, The Churchill Legend (Appelton, WI: Nelson, 1954), p. 389.
109. Review of Winston Churchill,  The Grand Alliance (1950), reproduced in Neilson,
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Needless to say, Fuller did not come off quite so lightly when it came to
reviews in other journals and newspapers. He wrote to William Sloane at
Rutgers University Press in early 1962 that the American reviews of  The
Conduct  of  War which  he  had  received had  generally been  more  appre-
ciative than the British, although he added that, rather strangely, "one of the
best appeared in 'Peace News,' the leading pacifist paper in this country."110
A review published by one of Fuller's long-time supporters in the United
States, Leo A. Codd, pointed towards the unfriendly reaction the book had
provoked in some quarters  in Britain.  He referred to  "muddle-headed re-
viewers," who had found "the Fuller doctrine exasperating," and criticized
an unnamed professor who had accused Fuller of being a "willing victim of
German propaganda," but without referring to  any specific  section in  the
book.111
The reviews which volume three of his study of "decisive battles" and
The Conduct  of  War,  1789-1961 received in  the  decidedly liberal  Times
Literary  Supplement largely  side-stepped  his  opinion  of  Churchill.  The
review  of  the  former  did  talk  of  his  "prejudices"  when  it  came  to  his
assessment  of  leadership  and  especially  statesmanship,  referring  to  his
indictment  of  leadership  in  total  war  as  "fierce  and  contemptuous."  But
while  there  was  a  discussion  of  his  critique  of  Roosevelt,  which  was
considered to be "at times exaggerated," his attacks on Churchill were not
mentioned; in fact, the reviewer thought the book to be a "major work."112 In
the review of the latter, although it was noted that something of Fuller's "old
authoritarian background remained," the book was nonetheless treated posi-
tively and  as  "thought-provoking."  Moreover,  there  was  a  willingness  to
acknowledge that his arguments about the "appeasement" of Russia during
the Second World War had some validity, even if the reviewer was anxious
to  point  out  the  distinction  made  by Fuller  between the  appeasement  of
Churchill as opposed to Roosevelt.113
Still, one of the best indicators of just how controversial Fuller's views
were,  even  in  1961,  can  be  gleaned  from the  correspondence  about  the
manuscript  for  The  Conduct  of  War between  Fuller  and  his  British  and
American  publishers.  Maurice  Temple  Smith  of  Eyre  and  Spottiswoode
wrote to Fuller in February 1961, after he had read the manuscript, and noted
that,  while  many of  his  points  were minor,  "the most  important  of  them
concern  your  remarks  on  Churchill  and  Roosevelt."  The  sentence  which
seems to have annoyed Fuller the most was underlined by him: "What seems
Churchill Legend, p. 410.
110. LHCMA, Fuller Papers, IV/6/19, Fuller to Sloane, n.d. [1962].
111. Leo  A.  Codd,  review of  The  Conduct  of  War,  Ordnance 46  (January/February
1962), pp. 578-79.
112. "War in  Our  Time," review of  Decisive  Battles  of  the  Western  World,  Vol.  III,
Times Literary Supplement 55 (20 July 1956), p. 431.
113. "Arms and the Soldier," review of The Conduct of War, Times Literary Supplement
60 (17 November 1961), p. 820.
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to me important is not whether your interpretation will eventually prove the
correct one, but that most readers at the present time will not accept it."
Temple Smith argued that if Churchill was still alive when the book was
published he thought he might sue the publisher successfully for libel. He
was prepared to concede that, were Fuller to have his general arguments ac-
cepted, he was going to have to "puncture the claims of Churchill's idol-
aters." Moreover, he was prepared to acknowledge the necessity of pointing
out that Churchill, "although a brilliant man, was also often erratic and emo-
tional, and that when involved in a combat he often engaged in it with such
zest  that  he  forgot  the  ends  for  which  the  combat  was  entered."  But  he
warned Fuller sharply about the dangers of making "anything which could
be taken as a personal attack."114
Temple  Smith  devoted  an  entire  paragraph  to  warning  about  Fuller's
assault on Roosevelt, which he also considered to be far too personal. While
he thought a critique of his wartime policy was "legitimate and necessary for
your argument," in the form of a personal attack it was "most dangerous."
He warned that in the case of Fuller's belief that Roosevelt had provoked
Japan into attacking America at Pearl Harbor, this view was "by no means
universally held." He added that American sources of information on the
issue differed and tended to "align themselves so strongly with the political
opinions of  the writer  that  one has to  treat  all  of  them with the greatest
reserve."  He  also  complained  that  all  the  sources  on  Roosevelt  cited  by
Fuller were "violent opponents." Temple Smith did accept that Roosevelt
had felt more sympathy for Communism than Nazism which had led him to
make settlements which favored the Russians after the war. He emphasized,
though, that it would support Fuller's argument far more if he simply por-
trayed both Roosevelt and Churchill as honest politicians who had commit-
ted the "cardinal error of forgetting that the end of war is policy." He con-
cluded that the publisher's reader had made the same points, adding that he
simply wanted to prevent Fuller from alienating any reader unnecessarily.115
The  American  publisher  of  The  Conduct  of  War,  Rutgers  University
Press,  reported  that  the  American  reader  had  not  provided  the  type  of
detailed editorial comments which Temple Smith had.116 Fuller then wrote to
both publishers to say that he had accepted all of the suggestions, at least in
modified  form,  and  in  particular  had  recast  the  section  on  Roosevelt's
policy.117 Writing to William Sloane at Rutgers, however, Fuller thought the
reaction of  Temple Smith "a bit exaggerated"; yet  he accepted that there
probably was personal animosity in his views and he agreed to tone down
some passages. But he lamented that "so many English publishers continue
to live in a kind of Victorian hangover – it is bad manners to criticize the
114. LHCMA, Fuller Papers, IV/6/7, Maurice Temple Smith to Fuller, 2 February 1961.
115. Ibid.
116. LHCMA, Fuller Papers, IV/6/10, Stewart to Fuller, 28 February 1961.
117. LHCMA, Fuller Papers, IV/6/11, Fuller to Eyre & Spottiswoode/Rutgers University
Press, 2 March 1961.
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squire."  He  thought  that  "Great  historical  characters,  like  Churchill  and
Roosevelt, are big enough men to take a lot of punches," and in delivering
those punches he asserted that "it will certainly do history no harm."118 Still,
the differences between the reactions at Eyre and Spottiswoode and Rutgers
University Press do suggest that the British were more sensitive in 1961 to
attacks on Churchill and Roosevelt than Americans were.
There is a final question which remains on Fuller's views, namely, did his
attacks on Churchill and his wartime policies have any impact upon other
historians? A most revealing route into this question is through the writings
of Basil Liddell Hart. While he made no direct criticisms of Churchill during
the war, he was plainly aware of Fuller's newspaper articles: not only had he
revived his friendship with Fuller in July 1942 after the latter had severed
relations in 1937,119 he recommended approvingly one of his most critical
articles in the Evening Standard to Bishop George Bell in February 1944.120
Having taken  inspiration  from Fuller's  writings  in  the  interwar  period,  it
seems that he started to take inspiration from him once again after the war,
not least of all as Fuller regularly sent him copies of his books and articles. 121
One sign of Fuller's influence is the way in which he started to adopt his
language when referring to Churchill, writing in October 1946 of the way in
which  "our  so-called  'leaders'  pathetically  drift  in  a  Churchillian  mental
fog."122
The first indication of Liddell Hart's new-found willingness to criticize
the  Prime  Minister's  performance  as  a  strategist  during  the  war  was  in
several newspaper articles published in 1947. The first of these pieces called
into question the wisdom of Britain's wartime policy of encouraging guer-
rilla operations. There was no direct criticism of Churchill, but he stated that
it was a policy which had appealed to the Prime Minister's "mind and tem-
perament."123 Having tested the water, there then followed two articles which
appeared in both the Sunday Pictorial and the Sunday Independent towards
the end of the year. The first piece took issue with Churchill's decision in
1941 to attempt to  block German designs on Greece.  He challenged the
118. SCUA Rutgers, Fuller Papers, box 3, file 34, Fuller to Stewart, 3 March 1961.
119. LHCMA, Liddell  Hart Papers, LH 1/302/283-4,  Liddell  Hart to Fuller, 9 and 19
July 1942.
120. LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/58/54, Liddell Hart to Bell, 12 February 1944,
recommending Fuller's article, "The Barbarity of War without Rules" (4 February 1944),
and LH 1/58/55, Bell to Liddell Hart, 19 February 1944, which indicates Bell had already
read it, showing also the appeal of Fuller's writings to left-wingers and pacifists.
121. In October 1946, for instance, Fuller sent him the English edition of Armament and
History. LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/302/326, Fuller to Liddell Hart, 15 October
1946.
122. LHCMA, Liddell  Hart Papers, LH 2/302/327,  Liddell  Hart  to Fuller,  17 October
1946.
123. B.H.  Liddell  Hart,  "Resistance  Movements  Not  Worth  While?"  Sunday  Inde-
pendent, 26 January 1947. Similar versions were published in the  Glasgow Herald, 24
January 1947, and Liverpool Daily Post, 30 January 1947.
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official version that the British had acted upon a Greek request for assis-
tance,  arguing  that  "Churchill's  eagerness  outran  the  practical  possibil-
ities."124 In the second piece,  Liddell Hart finally came out into the open
against  unconditional  surrender.  The critique was close to the essence of
Fuller's arguments, even if somewhat diluted: unconditional surrender had
lengthened the war, it had increased the cost of the occupation of Germany,
and it had led to Soviet predominance in Europe.125
The first  real  attempt at  a critique of  Churchill  the war leader,  of  the
intensity of that practised by Fuller in his immediate postwar writings, was
undertaken in a review of the first volume of Churchill's memoirs. This was
published in the Oxford Mail, Nottingham Journal, and Yorkshire Observer
on 4 October 1948, significantly, after Fuller's history of the Second World
War had appeared. What is particularly noteworthy is that the Oxford Mail
felt  the need to  publish a  eulogy of  Churchill  in  the column next to  the
review. First it was doubted whether historians in the future would "be able
to recapture fully the inspiration of his leadership in those days." While it
was conceded that Churchill had made mistakes, anyone would have made
these under the pressure of their responsibilities at that time. But several
examples were given of "his far-sighted genius and courage."126 The editor
was clearly fearful of the type of reaction which Liddell Hart's review might
provoke.
The review was, in fact, an opportunity for Liddell  Hart to attempt to
justify his own record in the interwar period. Unlike Fuller, he did not go
straight for the jugular. He thought that had Churchill been in power earlier
Britain might have been spared much. Yet his  compliments  were always
qualified,  such  as  in  the  statement:  "Mr.  Churchill  is  a  wonderful  man,
shining out from the gloom of an age of mediocrity. He not only compels
admiration  by  his  virtuosity,  but  inspires  affection  despite  his  intense
egocentricity."  Liddell  Hart  noted  that  Churchill  had  failed  to  see  the
dangers of allowing Japan and Italy to flout the League of Nations, while he
also considered that his sympathy for the Francoists in the Spanish Civil War
had blinded him to the dangers of German and Italian involvement; he even
criticized his endorsement of the "impracticable guarantee to Poland," made
without Russia's support. Despite the many positive aspects he identified in
Churchill's leadership, he asserted that "his dynamism is too strong for his
statesmanship."127
The  technique  of  using  reviews  of  Churchill's  memoirs  to  provide  a
critical  assessment of  his  performance as grand strategist  was one which
124. B.H. Liddell  Hart, "Riddles of the War (2): Famous Men – And the Great Greek
Blunder," Sunday Pictorial, 12 October 1947.
125. B.H. Liddell Hart, "Two Words: The War's Greatest Blunder," Sunday Pictorial, 7
December 1947, p. 11.
126. "Editorial: Winston," Oxford Mail, 4 October 1948.
127. B.H. Liddell  Hart,  "Churchill's  Story:  A Dauntless but a Dazzled Mind,"  Oxford
Mail, 4 October 1948.
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Liddell Hart was able to continue with his considerations of volumes three
and four. In some respects, his review of volume three, which dealt with
1941, was milder than his first review. He argued that Churchill  realized
certain plans would fail before they had been enacted, whereas his political
and military advisers had not. In the case of the dispatch of the British force
to Greece,  Churchill  had yielded to  his  advisers.  But  while  he displayed
"boldness" in the Middle East, he had displayed "a relative blindness over
the Far East."128 In his  review of volume four,  Liddell Hart continued to
employ  a  combination  of  back-handed  compliments  directed  towards
Churchill's abilities as an historian, together with suggestions that he had
often been right where his Chiefs of Staff had been wrong. Yet,  there is
criticism of his removal of Auchinleck, his school-boy like delight at being
in charge, as if "the war was a great game produced for his benefit," while
the historical treatment by Churchill of the Casablanca conference allowed
Liddell Hart the opportunity to take another swipe at the policy of uncon-
ditional surrender.129 The review of volume four was, in fact, too much for
one journalist, who took Liddell Hart to task in an article in the Yorkshire
Post, which then led to two subsequent exchanges between both men in the
columns of the paper.130
Liddell Hart's critique was not repeated again until an article appeared in
Encounter in  1966,  which  drew  heavily  on  his  previous  reviews  of
Churchill's war memoirs. With several obvious nuances, it largely repeated
his immediate postwar line of attack, which had drawn much of its inspi-
ration from Fuller. With  unconditional  surrender at the center of the dis-
cussion, Churchill was portrayed as a man who became obsessed with one
problem and then forgot the wider picture. He concluded: "A man may be
successful as a tactician without that capacity for 'comparison,' and the sense
of proportion from which it springs – but he will be almost certain to go
astray as a strategist and still more as a grand strategist."131 Three years later,
another piece on Churchill as a military strategist appeared in a high-profile
volume,  once  again  repeating  many  of  the  points  made  in  his  memoir
reviews, in particular, "the impression that his actual influence was much
less than is commonly supposed."132 The final historical critique by Liddell
Hart  could  be  found  in  his  History  of  the  Second  World  War,  which
appeared in the year of his death 1970. In this, one of his best-selling books,
128. B.H. Liddell Hart, "Looking over Churchill's Shoulder," The Listener, 27 July 1950.
129. B.H. Liddell Hart, "Mr. Churchill's Fourth Volume," The Listener, 9 August 1951.
130. 'WLA,'  "The  Yapping  at  Mr.  Churchill,"  Yorkshire  Post,  14  August  1951,  with
letters from Liddell  Hart  published together  with  WLA's replies on 25 August  and 1
September 1951.
131. B.H. Liddell Hart, "Churchill in War: A Study of His Capacity and Performance in
the Military Sphere," Encounter 26 (April 1966), pp. 14-22, quote, 22.
132. Liddell  Hart,  "Military  Strategist,"  esp.  pp.  196-97.  In  a  review  of  the  book,
Churchill's former Private Secretary judged that Liddell Hart had given Churchill "more
credit than has often been allowed him for World War I and less than his due for World
War II." J.R. Colville, "Churchill's Way," Sunday Times, 13 April 1969.
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there were watered-down versions of his previous postwar assessments.133
Liddell Hart was certainly one of the most well-known critics of Winston
Churchill.  It is important, however, that his writings be considered rather
than his own comments on them. In March 1946, he thought that there was
"still some prejudice against me in various Oxford circles because of the
views I published earlier in the war about the futility of pursuing victory, and
insisting on unconditional surrender."134 Such an interpretation was, at best,
optimistic; and, as we have seen, his first clear published comments were
made in 1947, or, arguably, even as late as 1948.135 It seems beyond doubt,
then, that, while he was critical of strategic bombing and unconditional sur-
render during the war in his private correspondence, the connection he made
between these policies and Churchill's wartime leadership first found their
way into his postwar historical reflections as a result of Fuller's writings both
during and after the war.136
Conclusion
Where then does this assessment of Fuller's critique of Winston Churchill as
a grand strategist leave us? What is beyond dispute is that Fuller did meet
with Churchill during the Great War and the interwar period often enough
that he was able to form a fairly clear view of his character, at the very least
in military questions. It has been demonstrated that Fuller underwent a re-
markable transformation in his attitude towards Churchill, a transition from
admiration  to  contempt,  which  would  appear  to  have  begun  before  the
outbreak of war, reaching its culmination point at some time towards the end
of 1944. But can this simply be explained by the arguments offered by Brian
133. B.H. Liddell Hart,  History of the Second World War (London: Cassell, 1970), esp.
pp. 15, 20, 51-59, 151-52.
134. LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/58/77, Liddell Hart to Bell, 17 March 1946.
The context to this comment was his application for the Chichele Professorship in the
History of War at All Souls College, Oxford, which he made the following month. See
BOL,  Murray Papers,  MS 150,  fol.65,  Liddell  Hart  to  Murray,  10  April  1946,  and,
fol.66-78, Liddell Hart to the Registrar, University of Oxford, 9 April 1946, enclosing his
application.
135. It should be noted, though, that there are some non-conformist remarks about the
conduct of the war in B.H. Liddell Hart, This Expanding War (London: Faber & Faber,
1942), esp. pp. 185-89, although only on p. 265 do we find a touch of negativity about
Churchill.
136. A further argument which strengthens this interpretation is that Liddell  Hart  was
only really a passing acquaintance of Churchill, so did not possess the personal insight
which  Fuller  did.  While  there  were  repeated  attempts  to  cultivate  Churchill  in  the
interwar period, these were politely rebuffed. A lunch was arranged in February 1928,
but the only instance when Liddell Hart was invited into Churchill's political circle was at
the time of the Munich crisis. See LHCMA, Liddell Hart Papers, LH 1/171/1-31, with the
invitation to lunch at LH 1/171/5, Edward Marsh to Liddell Hart, 29 February 1928, and
LH 1/171/29, for an invitation to a lunch at the Savoy Hotel, 29 September 1938, and LH
1/171/30, for an invite to an evening meeting, 29 September 1938. This lack of closer
knowledge of Churchill may have meant that Liddell Hart lacked the confidence to attack
the wartime Prime Minister in print.
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Holden Reid and A.J. Trythall that, on the one hand, Fuller was attracted to
"unpopular causes" and, on the other, that Churchill was a symbol for Fuller
of Britain's policy of unconditional surrender and strategic bombing?
In the first  instance,  Holden Reid  is  certainly correct  that  Fuller,  as  a
writer  at  any rate,  knew that  adopting unpopular  interpretations attracted
attention and, hence, sold books. But in the case of his attacks on Churchill
it is only a partial explanation because of the extent of Fuller's animosity.
Furthermore, Trythall seems incorrect in his judgement because, although
Fuller  was  a  severe  critic  of  unconditional  surrender  and  strategic
bombing,137 these were but two of several dimensions to his attacks on the
grand strategy of Britain's wartime Prime Minister. In order to understand
the Fuller critique we must consider what were, in fact, five main strands:
first, there was his personal attitude to Churchill, which was bound up with
how he had wanted to see British politics develop in the 1930s; second,
there was the influence of Churchill on the home front and the management
of the war effort; third, there was Fuller's understanding of his psyche and
personality;  fourth,  there  were  specific  strategic  decisions  made  by
Churchill; and, fifth, there were Churchill's major wartime strategic policies.
To take the first point, Fuller's initial admiration of Churchill was largely
bound up with his experience of the role he played as Minister of Munitions
during the First World War. Fuller believed that the British Army's GHQ
obstructed new ideas and that it required a strong civilian to overcome the
barriers erected by military conservatives. There are even hints between the
lines in a 1918 memorandum to Churchill that he wished to suggest he saw
him as a potential, strong-arm, wartime leader, combining military and polit-
ical roles.138 It may well have been, then, that in the turbulent 1930s Fuller
looked to Churchill to provide a bridge between the Conservative Party and
the extreme right and create some form of semi-dictatorial government so
that the strong leadership he craved could be asserted. That this did not take
place at the moment Fuller thought it most necessary may well have fueled
his bitterness towards Churchill.
It was both ironic and typical of Fuller that once the sweeping measures
required to steer the nation towards total war were introduced he started to
complain  about  them.  Almost  in  the  spirit  of  George  Orwell,  he  had  in
February 1944 lamented the regimentation in British life which had put the
nation in "barracks, on airfields or in workshops – the trinity of total war."139
It is this apparent oscillation between left and right which lends his writing
its  stimulating  quality  and  fascination.  There  was  also  a  very  definite
137. His views on strategic bombing also informed his post-1945 military theories on
new technology and atomic weapons.  See Alaric Searle,  "Was There a 'Boney' Fuller
after 1945? Major-General J.F.C. Fuller as Military Theorist  and Commentator,  1945-
1966," War in History 11 (July 2004), pp. 327-57.
138. TMARL,  Fuller  Papers,  Private  Journal,  A12,  memorandum  by  Fuller  sent  to
Churchill, 2 March 1918, Churchill to Fuller, 8 March 1918.
139. Fuller, "Danger in a New Socialism," Evening Standard, 18 February 1944.
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military dimension to  his  critique:  namely,  he clearly disapproved of  the
concentration of so much decision-making power in Churchill's hands when
he became Minister of Defence at the same time as holding the office of
Prime Minister. While some historians have judged this as a strength in the
management of Britain's war effort,  senior officers at the time were frus-
trated and driven to despair by Churchill's working methods.140
When it came to Churchill's personality, Fuller was certainly well placed
to comment on the Prime Minister's foibles. Indeed, he was not only astute
but understood better than most what made Churchill tick. In an era when he
was praised as the war leader with a sure grasp of grand strategy, Fuller
commented cuttingly on his impulsiveness which, he implied, showed that
his military leadership was unsound. This linked in with the fourth strand of
his critique, namely his questioning of a number of the individual decisions
made by Churchill, which Fuller judged to be deeply flawed. Undoubtedly,
his most biting criticism of Churchillian strategy was in relation to the Italian
Campaign. Here Fuller was perhaps too strident as, after all, the campaign
did draw vital German resources away from the Eastern Front and northern
France.  Yet,  again,  Fuller was instinctively arguing along the right  lines,
insofar as Churchill's initial intention had been quite different because he
had assumed that Italy would collapse, but had not anticipated the speed of
the German response.141
Finally,  was  Fuller's  critique  of  the  policies  of  strategic  bombing  and
unconditional surrender actually his major point of attack, with Churchill
merely forming the convenient symbol for these two policies – as has been
argued by Trythall? Here the answer must be negative: Fuller held Churchill
and Roosevelt personally accountable for unconditional surrender, while the
responsibility for  strategic  bombing  was  laid  firmly at  the  British  Prime
Minister's door. The other points already raised – his own personal bitterness
towards Churchill, as well as his deep suspicion of his qualities as a grand
strategist – all contributed to the venom with which he attacked strategic
bombing  and  unconditional  surrender.  Based  on  his  understanding  of
Clausewitz, it was Churchill's responsibility to tailor the means of winning
the war to achievable postwar goals. It is precisely because his assault on
these policies was based on a number of other considerations in relation to
Churchill's wartime role as supreme strategist that he was so pronounced in
140. See here the discussion in Keegan, "Churchill's  Strategy," pp.  328-33, who high-
lights succinctly the positive dimensions of Churchill's management of the war. However,
it seems that historical opinion now supports Fuller on this specific point. Richard Overy
has stated: "It is difficult not to conclude that Allied strategy succeeded despite Churchill,
though his pugnacity and spirit remained a valuable symbol of the Allied will to win."
Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (London: Jonathan Cape, 1995), p. 268.
141. For background on Churchill's strategy for the Italian campaign and the historical
controversy  surrounding  it,  see:  Ben-Moshe,  Churchill,  pp.  197-224;  Reynolds,  In
Command of History, pp. 373-88; and, Brian Holden Reid, "The Italian Campaign, 1943-
45: A Reappraisal of Allied Generalship,"  The Journal of Strategic Studies 13 (March
1990), pp. 128-61.
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his criticism.142
Nonetheless, it ought to be clear that Fuller's interpretation was often one-
sided,  as  a  number  of  reviewers  of  his  books  pointed  out.  The  flaw in
Fuller's  argument  can  in  part  be  explained  by  the  last  traces  of  fascist
thought which can be identified in the third volume of his Decisive Battles
of the Western World. His failure to recognize, or at least to play down, the
racial policies of annihilation pursued by Hitler's National Socialist regime
undermined much of his argument. His alternative strategy, which he pro-
posed  in  The  Conduct  of  War,  1789-1961,  would  have  been  to  allow
Bolshevism and National Socialism to "cripple each other," and would have
– so the argument went – given Britain the time she needed to re-arm and
then intervene on the side of the nation which was on the back-foot.143 This
was, in effect, the old nineteenth century "balance of power" outlook, but
one which had been developed in an era before the totalitarian extremes.
Nonetheless, it could not be dismissed entirely out of hand, at least, that is,
before the true nature of the Nazi policies of racial destruction had become
known beyond the confines of intelligence agencies.
What  Fuller  sought  to  advocate  was  favored  by many British  officers
before the outbreak of war, as can be seen in a letter sent by Major General
George Lindsay to Major General Archibald Wavell in November 1936. In a
discussion of Wavell's visit to the Soviet Union in September of that year,
Lindsay offered the view that if Germany attacked the USSR, whatever the
outcome, she would receive "a pretty good mauling." He thought that war
between the two dictatorships "would be quite ruthless," so that once it was
over, neither side would be in a position to take on anyone else. Hence, he
argued, "I feel we must keep out of this war as long as we possibly can."144
The problem was that the nature of Nazi extermination policies changed the
implications of such a stance. While far less of what we now know about
Nazi extermination policies was known in the 1950s, enough had come out
at the Nuremberg trials to enable at least some adjustment to Fuller's views.
His  support  for  reconciliation  with  Germany,  not  to  mention  his  under-
writing of the campaign for West German rearmament, did make him open
to accusations of turning a blind eye to the crimes of the Third Reich; this
was exacerbated by the fact that his writings, and especially his  History of
the Second World War, 1939-1945, proved popular with former Wehrmacht
generals.145
142. His argument that strategic bombing wasted resources does seem now to be more
questionable from a purely military point of view. The balance of opinion is that it did
shorten the war, representing one of the major factors contributing to Germany's defeat.
For a balanced discussion, Overy, Why the Allies Won, pp. 101-33.
143. Fuller, Conduct of War, p. 264.
144. LHCMA,  Liddell  Hart  Papers,  LH  15/12/14,  George  M.  Lindsay  to  Archibald
Wavell, 13 November 1936.
145. See, for example, the references in: Hasso von Manteuffel, "German Morale, 1939-
1945," An Consantoir, November 1949, pp. 522-26, here 526; Siegfried Westphal, Heer
in Fesseln (Bonn:  Athenäum, 2nd ed.,  1952),  p.  46;  Werner Picht,  et  al.,  Bilanz des
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It  would  be  unreasonable,  though,  to  judge  Fuller's  assessment  of
Churchill by today's standards of scholarship. The main means of measure-
ment  must  be  against  his  postwar  contemporaries  who  commented  on
Churchill:  in other  words,  how out of  step with mainstream opinion was
Fuller's view of Churchill as a grand strategist? As has been shown, it ran
contrary to the broad direction of public and historical opinion during and
after  the  war,  even  if  senior  military  officers  may have  been  quietly  in
agreement with some of his analysis. Significantly, just at the moment when
Churchillian rhetoric came into its own in 1940, Fuller reacted instinctively
against it:146 he found it to be a substitute for sound strategy; and, he disliked
its appeal to the mentality of the crowd. While other military critics came
later,  and some of  his  views filtered unattributed into  the  public  domain
through the pen of Basil Liddell Hart, no writer in Britain set out in such a
determined fashion both during and after the hostilities to assault the Prime
Minister's wartime military record.
In  the  final  analysis,  Fuller's  criticism  of  Churchill's  conduct  of  the
Second World War was driven to an extent by moral outrage at strategic
bombing.147 But Fuller was never someone who relied entirely on emotions.
His arguments were also based on clear strategic logic. Shortly after the end
of the war, reflecting on the implications of atomic energy, he talked of the
need for a return to Clausewitzian warfare; yet, it was "no good burking the
fact that the world to-day is faced by Churchillian warfare – by bleedings,
blastings and burnings, by devastation, obliteration and annihilation, how-
ever insane and unprofitable these may be."148 This was, in many ways, the
ultimate  form of  condemnation  –  "Churchillian  warfare"  held  up  as  the
negation of "Clausewitzian warfare." But this juxtaposition demonstrates the
central  cornerstone  of  Fuller's  thesis  on  Churchill  as  a  grand  strategist.
Whatever  the  underestimation  by  him of  the  many difficulties  faced  by
Britain's wartime leader,  it  should be acknowledged that  the first  serious
revisionist of the "Churchill myth" was J.F.C. Fuller.
Zweiten Weltkrieges (Oldenburg:  Gerhard Stalling,  1953),  pp.  162,  173,  459-60,  465;
and,  Valentin  Feurstein,  Irrwege  der  Pflicht  1938-1945 (Munich/Wels:  Welsermühl,
1963), pp. 43, 130-31, 138-39, 152, 214, 292.
146. Churchill's rhetoric was communicated to the general public largely via the press, or
by radio announcers. He disliked speaking on the radio; indeed, he came across badly
over the air waves. Paul Addison,  Churchill on the Home Front, 1900-1950 (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1992), pp. 334-35. For a sense of how views on Churchill's rhetoric have
changed since 1945: Lord Justice Birkett, "Churchill the Orator," in Eade, ed., Churchill
‒ By His Contemporaries, pp. 223-33; and, David Cannadine, "Language: Churchill as
the Voice of Destiny," in idem, In Churchill's Shadow: Confronting the Past in Modern
Britain (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 85-113.
147. In some cases, the language and moral arguments he used seem to anticipate the
writings of more recent moral and philosophical critics of strategic bombing, such as Jörg
Friedrich,  Der Brand:  Deutschland  im Bombenkrieg  1940-1945 (Munich:  Propyläen,
2002), and A.C. Grayling, Among the Dead Cities: Was the Allied Bombing of Civilians
in WWII a Crime or a Necessity? (London: Bloomsbury, 2006).
148. Fuller, Armament and History, pp. 200-01.
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Fuller's rejection of the claims that Winston Churchill was omniscient in
matters of grand strategy during the Second World War was his own per-
sonal  battle  for  intellectual  survival  in  the  face  of  the  stifling  effects  of
propaganda  during  the  conflict.  In  doing  so,  he  provided  an  alternative
version to official statements during the war and eulogies of Churchill after
it; this in turn laid the foundations for subsequent reconsiderations of the
wartime  Prime  Minister's  approach  to  strategy.  And,  for  this  reason,  his
critique still deserves – indeed demands – the attention of historians of the
Second World War.
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